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The Shape of Things

ON THE STALINGRAD FRONT NAZI ATTACKS have slackened, but a new threat to vital Russian positions has developed in the Caucasus. There the Germans have switched their main effort from the Mozdok region to the central foothills below the pass over which the great Georgian military road leads to Tiflis. They have captured Nalchik and are now thrusting toward Ordzhonikidze, the railhead at the northern end of the highway. Here as elsewhere the Red Army is putting up a great fight, but it is handicapped by difficult communications between the lateral valleys which it is defending. On the other hand, the Nazis will encounter increasingly heavy going as they work upward toward the deep snows that cover the pass 16,000 feet above sea level. Meanwhile it must cheer the Russians to know that a rain of shells and bombs as heavy as they have had to endure at Stalingrad is now crashing on Rommel's lines in Egypt. It is true that owing to the comparatively small number of men involved Soviet commentators tend to regard the desert battle as a sideshow, but the fact remains that a British victory would have important strategic results beneficial to Russia. Cairo continues to be reserved in its claims, but General Montgomery's tactics appear to be wearing down Axis resistance. And his armored forces are still in reserve ready to mop up if the enemy lines crack. ✳

THE STRONG JAPANESE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE in the Solomons has apparently been beaten back, thanks largely to American air power. Navy and army fliers share the credit, and Admiral Halsey and General MacArthur deserve congratulations for the effectiveness with which they have cooperated. We should also like to commend the navy for speeding up its news releases, even though this has added to the difficulty of reconstructing the course of events chronologically. It appears, however, that a very powerful Japanese task force, seeking to outflank our position in the southern Solomons, was met by our fleet in the neighborhood of the Stewart Islands, northeast of Guadalcanal. As in the Coral Sea and Midway battles the actual fighting seems to have been carried on by planes, though it is not yet entirely certain that there were no clashes between surface craft.

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Our blows were struck not only by carrier-borne aircraft but also by land-based Flying Fortresses and dive bombers, which intervened with effective and nicely timed blows. Our acknowledged losses were an unnamed carrier and the destroyer Porter sunk and several vessels damaged. The navy makes no claims of enemy ships actually sunk, but a great many were damaged, including two carriers and two battleships, and it is reasonable to suppose that some of these did not return to their bases. Our own experience has shown that heavily bombed warships do not usually sink immediately but succumb after a few hours to internal injuries. In any case Secretary Knox's claim that we have "won the first round" seems to be justified, for it was the Japanese who retired. Part of their fleet is back again at Buin in the northern Solomons, where it is being steadily pounded by MacArthur's fliers. And control of the waters around Guadalcanal is in our hands, making it possible for surface craft to bombard enemy shore positions by daylight.

*

WESTBROOK PEGLER NEEDS A CHAMPION, and ever ready to defend the underprivileged, we rush to his support. Poor Peg's recent assault on the character and purposes of Eleanor Roosevelt has raised again the question of whether he is a deliberately vicious fellow or merely an unfortunate man who finds himself with a keen style and no mind to match it. The defense inclines to the latter belief. Pegler, it must be remembered, lays no claim to any knowledge of the world affairs which he discusses every day in his column. He is fiercely anti-intellectual and associates any kind of organized knowledge with long hair, brain trusts, and Red Russia. He really believes, we contend, that the wife of the President went to London to plot the class struggle which will one day bring her and Franklin D. Roosevelt to power. Britain, you see, "is the base from which her communistic and Social Democratic authorities or feeders are now operating," and as a "cunning and persistent politician" she has to be on hand while plans for the overthrow of the American system are being worked out. Since precedents are always useful in these matters, we wish to draw on the case of *The People* vs. *John Glutz* (N. Y. Supp. 327) in which defense counsel pleaded with the jury: "My client may talk like a fool and he may act like a fool, but don't be deceived, gentlemen. He really is a fool."

*

IN THE MOVIES THAT OLD REPROBATE, SEX, is rendered invisible by an impenetrable Hays of censorship. But sex will out, and it seems about to encompass the ruin of Errol Flynn as it once caused the fall of Fatty Arbuckle. We find it very difficult to choose between Mr. Flynn and the two movie-mad girls, Peggy and Betty, who have assumed the role of outraged virtue in a real court. Neither of them pretends to have been seduced against her will. Betty admitted that she had been "raped" before. "I said 'No' three times," she said, describing one episode, "then I disrobed." But both girls happen to be under eighteen, and the law of California rules that a sex offense against a girl under eighteen constitutes rape, regardless of consent—a state has to have *some* standards. One might think that Mr. Flynn would have had at least enough gray matter, or legal advice, to observe the statutory limit if for no higher reason than to protect his lucrative career from such ruinous assaults. We can't say we should miss Mr. Flynn as a celluloid lover—his banishment would save us the trouble of making sure we missed him; we do not share the enthusiasm of the giggling Betty, who revealed that two days after the "criminal attack" she had returned, so to speak, to the scene of the crime by going to see his newest picture, "Desperate Journey." But we hope, nevertheless, that the case will be thrown out of court.

*

THE ORDER LIMITING SALARIES TO $25,000 a year after payment of federal taxes is a crude and ineffective instrument for accomplishing the limitation of income that was twice proposed by the President. The regulations issued by Director Byrnes will limit earned but not unearned income. Since the bulk of the really large incomes in the country are unearned, the limitation on salaries will probably accomplish little in the way of curbing inflationary spending or eliminating the discontent that results from flagrant inequalities in war-time sacrifices. It has the disadvantage of limiting the incentives of management without penalizing idleness. And it will prove extremely difficult to administer. Responsibility for the inadequacy of the order rests not with Director Byrnes, who went as far as he could under the law, but with Congress for failing to accomplish its purpose by the simpler and more direct method of taxation. Congress not only failed to consider the President's specific request for a $25,000 ceiling on income but ignored the vital question of morale by enacting a tax bill in which a disproportionate share of the burden is placed on incomes ranging from $1,500 to $2,500.

*

A CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FORTY-HOUR week has been under way for some time in a large number of the country's newspapers. In trying to make a case against the present provisions of the Wages and Hours Act, many of the papers have been guilty of a shameless distortion of the facts. In contrasting the average work week of fifty-six hours in England with the average forty-three-hour week in this country, the usually careful New York *Times* neglects to point out, for instance, that England has retained its standard work week throughout the war, paying overtime as provided under union con-

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tracts for the additional hours. Most of the papers also fail to point out that many of our essential war industries are now working a forty-eight-hour week, or longer, and that the only effect of wiping out the provision requiring the payment of time and a half for overtime would be to reduce wages for the workers and increase profits for the companies. Most workers are willing to put in additional hours if necessary to increase war production, but there is no reason why they should consent to a cut in wages. The only way the government could benefit from the reduced costs resulting from the abolition of overtime pay would be through a renegotiation of all existing contracts. But no one advocating revision of the wage-hour law has even taken notice of this fact.

*

REAR ADMIRAL EMORY LAND HATES UNION organizers, and if there is any substance in the charges brought against him by Senator Aiken of Vermont, we can see why. In a letter to Senator Walsh of the Naval Affairs Committee, Senator Aiken accuses the Maritime Commission, of which Land is chairman, of brazen collusion with private interests. "It [the commission] has spent millions of dollars in subsidizing ships for private corporations, particularly the Alcoa Steamship Company, owned by the Aluminum Company of America, when these ships were intended primarily to carry the goods of the corporation itself. It has failed to collect the statutory 3½ per cent interest charge from shipping corporations on secured and miscellaneous accounts (other than new construction), constituting an estimated indebtedness of $45,139,824." These are only two points of the indictment. The commission is accused of having bought for $45,000 an old Coast Guard cutter which it knew had been sold six years ago for $6,605. It is said to have been a party to transactions whereby completed ships were sold to private companies which later resold them, with the commission's knowledge, to the navy at a higher price. Presumably these charges will be fully investigated by the proper authorities. There was ample cause for removing Admiral Land after his outburst two weeks ago; if Senator Aiken's accusations are well founded, he should certainly be eliminated.

*

THE RIGHT OF 10,000,000 AMERICANS TO choose their representatives in Washington hinges on the battle now being waged to bring the anti-poll-tax bill to a vote in the Senate before the end of the session. It is taken for granted that the bill will pass by a substantial margin if it can be brought to a vote. It will be recalled that in August the upper House voted thirty-three to twenty to abolish the poll tax for soldiers. The issue raised in the present bill is essentially the same. If the poll tax is undemocratic as applied to soldiers, it is equally undemocratic for the civilian population. For rather obvious reasons, support of the poll tax is limited primarily to the Senators from the eight poll-tax states. Yet this small group could carry on a filibuster under the Senate's free and easy rules. Whether they will dare to tie up all legislation in the upper House for the last two months of the session in order to thwart the free exercise of the right of suffrage in their states depends on how actively public opinion in the other forty states demands passage of the bill.

*

REWI ALLEY, FOUNDER OF THE CHINESE Industrial Cooperatives, has been retained, temporarily at least, in his post as field secretary as a result of protests by liberal groups in China against his dismissal. To what extent this action represents a solution of the conflict that has grown up around the movement is not clear at this distance. But those who know Alley personally are confident that he would not remain if the essential democracy of the movement had been destroyed. The clarification of the situation in Chungking makes it difficult to understand the action of the United China Relief in withholding a very considerable amount of money which it has collected for the cooperatives. The United China Relief is only a collection agency and as such is not responsible for the distribution of funds. This responsibility rests with Indusco and the International Committee, both of which are still operating. We assume that steps are being taken to forward the badly needed funds to the cooperatives.

Monopoly in News

THE Department of Justice is being bitterly attacked for launching an anti-trust suit against the Associated Press. Once again the banner "freedom of the press" is being unfurled by the publishers as if that precious constitutional right were their exclusive possession. We must remind them that freedom of the press is primarily a right of citizens as a whole—the consumers of printed matter—and that any tendency toward a monopoly in the publishing field is an abridgment of that right.

In its complaint against the A. P. the Department of Justice certainly makes out a prima facie case in support of the charge that our major news-gathering organization constitutes "a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade." It is the courts, however, which are being called upon to decide whether or not this charge can be sustained, and we fail to see why the government should be attacked for seeking a formal legal test of so important a public issue. Our sensitive publishers must learn to distinguish between prosecution and persecution.

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The gravamen of the charge against the A. P. in our view is not that it is a monopoly in itself but that its membership requirements are such as to promote and perpetuate local newspaper monopolies by placing obstacles in the way of new competition. No daily newspaper can exist without access to the services of a news agency. If it is barred from membership in the A. P., its choice is restricted to the United Press and the International News Service, neither of which has such extensive coverage. Furthermore, both these commercial agencies are controlled by publishing chains; so that in many cities a new newspaper may be compelled to rely on an agency closely connected with a competitor. This situation is undoubtedly a serious handicap to any would-be newspaper promoter and one that helps to account for the low birth rate of daily journals. More and more, local competition between newspapers is becoming a thing of the past. According to a Federal Trade Commission report, in 1940 there were only 181 cities in the United States with competing daily newspapers, as compared with 1,245 cities in which there was a local monopoly.

This is not a healthy state of affairs. In a recent University of Chicago Round Table discussion, Samuel E. Thomason, publisher of the Chicago *Times,* declared: "In my judgment the free press that the public is entitled to is one in which any member of the public can find a newspaper in which he can have confidence and, incidentally, in which he must have interest. The function of the newspaper publisher is merely to see that the public doesn't lose its free press, not that *he* doesn't lose his free press." It can hardly be denied that in many American communities many citizens cannot find the kind of newspaper to which Mr. Thomason says they are entitled, and to this extent it may be said that the public has lost its free press.

The answer filed by the A. P. to the complaint of the Department of Justice has, however, little bearing on this aspect of the question. Claiming to be "a mutual cooperative association," the A. P. asserts that if it were obliged to admit every paper prepared to pay a pro rata share of expenses, it would become merely "a commercial news agency." Further, it declares that in this case it might really become a monopoly, since "in view of the good-will attaching to its name . . . it might well become the only news agency furnishing complete news coverage." These statements show a queer confusion about the principles of cooperative organization, the first of which is that membership must be open on equal terms to all. And if the A. P. adopted this principle, it would not become a monopoly even though it might obtain exclusive possession of the news-agency field. For it would be offering all consumers of its product—news—the same opportunity to buy it at the lowest economic cost.

In its answer the A. P. makes great play with the case of the Chicago *Sun,* alleging that the government only moved against it after membership had been denied to the *Sun.* This is no reply to the charge of monopoly, and its place in the brief must be ascribed to an attempt to confuse the issues with political red herrings. The government complaint does, indeed, cite the exclusion of the *Sun*—as well as that of the politically opposite Washington *Times-Herald*—but it is thoroughly justified in so doing since this provides a flagrant example of the way in which the A. P.'s rules operate against the public interest. Until the advent of the *Sun* nearly a year ago, many citizens of Chicago could not find a morning paper in which they could "have confidence." The monopoly of the Chicago *Tribune,* a monopoly which it successfully fought to preserve at the last A. P. convention, was buttressed by its exclusive possession of the A. P. franchise. It is true that the *Sun* has succeeded in establishing itself despite this handicap, but the fact remains that its exclusion is a serious obstacle to its growth.

Incidentally, in the course of its brief the A. P. most unfairly and unnecessarily repeats the attacks made against Marshall Field, owner of the *Sun,* by the Chicago *Tribune.* Publication of the *Sun,* it declares, enables Field "to deduct from his personal income tax whatever loss he may sustain by reason thereof." The result is, it continues, that Field enjoys a subsidy at government expense which places him at a great competitive advantage. How far are the newspapers supporting the A. P. brief prepared to carry the implications of this charge? Is it in the publishing business alone that a man must refuse to invest his money in an enterprise which may yield only losses for some years? Is it true that high taxes promote risk-taking, and if so why is the conservative press always telling us that high taxes discourage rich men from venturing their wealth? Until we receive some intelligible reply to these questions we shall regard the pleading of the A. P. in this particular as both specious and nauseous.

Negroes and Unions

DISCRIMINATION against Negroes by powerful international and local unions of the American Federation of Labor has become a national scandal. It is too late for weasel-worded apologies, for assurances that "the situation is improving," for pious citation of the federation's formal—and meaningless—resolutions against race bias, for reminders that employers are more frequently guilty of discrimination than labor unions. These rationalizations are as obsolete as they are unconvincing. They merely reflect the inertia and complacency and—in some cases—the outright prejudices of the A. F. of L.'s high command.

Nor is there any point in the A. F. of L.'s protest that airing the issue will give "aid and comfort" to labor's

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enemies. The issue has been publicly presented to Westbrook Pegler and his cohorts by such A. F. of L. dignitaries as Tom Ray, boss of Local 72 of the Boilermakers' Union, which has a closed-shop contract with Henry Kaiser. Ray recently informed reporters that he would "pull the place down" if Negroes were given equal classification rights at Kaiser's Portland yard. As this is written, government officials have summoned a conference for November 10 at which Ray will be confronted with new demands for relaxation of his lily-white standards. John P. Frey, head of the A. F. of L.'s metal-trades department, has even sent Ray an indignant telegram, and has indicated that he will support the government representatives in their showdown with the Portland metal-trades crowd. His bold gesture, however, comes after weeks of behind-the-scenes conferences and pleadings to persuade Ray to treat Negroes—who traveled from New York to take jobs at the Kaiser plant—as fellow-workers. Moreover, on the same day that Frey made public his telegram William Green was insisting in New York that the federation was powerless to do anything except write telegrams. "I can't tell Ray what to do," he said. "It's like the President. Can he tell the governor of a state what to do?"

Ray may ultimately yield, but the total problem will remain, and other Rays will dictate their own policies for war production. They will do so as long as Green flaunts his own lack of authority. They will do so until federation leaders clean house at the top as well as at the bottom, putting pressure on international unions which retain color clauses in their constitutions and disciplining local big-shots who exclude Negroes from jobs.

The federation's recent convention failed to meet the issue. It heard A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters—and one of two Negro delegates to the Toronto meeting—deliver his annual indictment. His bill of particulars was not new; the A. F. of L. had heard it before. Randolph cited more than ten international unions which have color clauses or "ritualistic provisions" that bar Negro workers; among them are such important units as the Machinists, the Boilermakers, and the Department of Railway Employees. He mentioned others, including the Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and the Plumbers, which have "unwritten laws" excluding Negroes. He described international unions as influential as the Carpenters which have no constitutional color lines but permit locals to do as they please; the locals are often pleased to draw the color line. Finally he condemned the Jim Crow units which have been created by the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks and other unions as a "compromise" solution. These "auxiliaries" permit Negroes to join, pay their dues, hold separate meetings—but deny them the right to elect delegates to national conventions.

Randolph had been heard and ignored at previous conventions; but this was the year when federation orators felt called upon to pay longer and lustier tributes to the democratic way of life and a free post-war world. This, moreover, is a time of approaching man-power shortages, when victory over our enemies requires the complete mobilization of our man-power. The federation's leaders weren't moved. They listened to Randolph and they ignored his appeal. They turned down even his minimum request—the creation of a committee to investigate cases of discrimination within the federation. Such a step, A. F. of L. leaders have always explained, would violate the ancient "autonomy" of federation unions. Moreover, a resolution adopted by the convention said, "We are doubtful whether any method other than the educational one can make the progress which is necessary." Tom Girdler used to express the same views about the Wagner Act.

Only Dan Tobin tried to make a reply; it was a dismal effort. For it was no answer to accuse Randolph of "lighting the torch of disunity," no answer to say that hundreds of A. F. of L. units welcome Negro members, no answer to say that the Teamsters have always loved the Negro worker. In effect Tobin talked like an apologist for lynching who takes pains to point out that many Negroes die natural deaths.

The Manpower Commission has stressed the urgency of increasing Negro employment in war production. In the coming months every worker—black or white, male or female—must serve in the post for which he is best fitted. This must be done whether Governor Dixon of Alabama or Tom Ray of Portland likes it or not. Labor representatives on the Manpower Commission are opposing enactment of new work-or-fight legislation and employment controls. Green has publicly pleaded for further trial of "voluntary methods." The Negro issue is a key test. Are A. F. of L. officials prepared to open all the doors to Negroes? Are they ready to challenge international unions which cling to constitutional provisions against Negroes? Will they crack down on intransigent local officials—not via Western Union appeals but by summary dismissal or revocation of charters? "Autonomy" in the federation is sacrosanct only when its officials don't want to act. If a union local fell into the hands of avowed Nazi agents, would its "autonomy" be respected? Is Ray much above that level?

The truth is that a clean-up is neither as difficult nor as complex a process as the A. F. of L. leaders suggest. A few decisive steps in individual cases would have repercussions throughout the federation; repudiation of Jim Crow by one powerful international would put others on the spot. Instead, Tobin and other A. F. of L. chiefs have covered up for the offending unions and Woll has fashioned various profound legalisms to safeguard them.

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The Strategy of Reprisal

By FREDA KIRCHWEY

THE Axis war of reprisals moved into a new area when the Nazi Foreign Office let it be known that Germany and its associates were considering the advisability of denouncing the Geneva convention in regard to the treatment of prisoners of war. This threat, the sickening implications of which have sent a chill through every non-Axis nation, is obviously an answer to Britain's proposal that the Swiss government investigate the original German charges. The Germans, it will be recalled, put in chains some 1,300 British and Canadian prisoners of war as a reprisal for the alleged chaining of captured Germans after the Dieppe raid. Thereupon a similar number of German prisoners were put in chains in Canada and England. These acts set off a barrage of charges and counter-charges. They were followed by Japan's promise to punish for "inhuman cruelty to civilians" the American fliers captured after the raid on Tokyo. And the anti-Axis world discovered that it was faced by a new and peculiarly horrible variety of political warfare. How it is to be met, no government seems to know.

One thing is certain. Hitler's war of reprisals, like his war on the innocent inhabitants of conquered territories, will neither be waged nor settled according to any rules laid down in the past by civilized nations. Such rules will be used by Hitler only as weapons against those who respect them. They will be used as fake alibis to excuse in advance acts of terrorism to come. And no decent peace in this war against helpless men can be negotiated through the good offices of any neutral power. Even to suggest such procedure is to appear to accept Hitler as an honorable opponent who has made his charges in good faith. The one useful purpose that may be served by a neutral investigation of the facts is to prove to the non-Axis world the nature and purpose of the Axis reprisals.

Hitler's threat to denounce the Geneva convention was, of course, his only possible next move. He must now do as he has always done—follow specific false charges with vastly broader ones, step up the offensive, and, when the rules can no longer be used against the enemy, wipe them out altogether on the pretense that the enemy has violated them.

But if legal procedures are likely to prove useful to the Allies only as a form of counter-propaganda, if they have no value as a deterrent or to save prisoners already suffering reprisals, what can be done? The half-hearted counter-reprisals instituted against German prisoners are certainly no answer. The British victims are still in chains, and Hitler has threatened to visit vengeance on Allied prisoners, without regard to nationality, in a ratio of three for every German suffering reprisal. But it needed no new threats of frightfulness to teach the old lesson that in a competition in terror the Axis war lords are sure to win. They will play the game according to a double-or-quits system that other nations would never dare to adopt. Already Hitler's spokesmen have threatened to deprive of sight and hearing an unannounced number of British prisoners in Germany if German prisoners are "inhumanly" treated by the Allies. A war of reprisals is won before it starts by the nation trained and hardened to methods of terror at home.

What is necessary is a cool examination of the reasons why Germany, followed so closely by Japan, has adopted this new strategy. Assuming, as we may reasonably do, that Hitler expected retaliation in kind, what use can he make of it? It is unlikely that he hoped to frighten his enemies into inaction by the threat of mistreating prisoners. The sickening brutality practiced against captives —military and civilian alike—in Russia has not weakened the morale of the Red Army. It has stiffened it by generating a murderous hate. The Nazi atrocities in the occupied countries have created a spirit of general rebellion in place of dull apathy. Hitler can hardly believe that the British, who were forged into a solid fighting force by the fires of the blitz, will waver or give up in the face of new threats.

I feel sure that the Nazis have launched their war against prisoners in the confident hope of counter-reprisals. For counter-reprisals can be presented both to the German people and to the German army as unprovoked atrocities—samples of what the soldier must expect if he surrenders, what the simple German citizen must expect if the Allied forces succeed in their plans for invasion. Counter-reprisals will only provide propaganda material to bolster up the faltering courage of the German people with threats of the horror that will follow defeat. In an article published in *The Nation* over a year ago J. Alvarez del Vayo wrote: "It would be unduly optimistic to expect the Nazis and their accomplices, when their backs are to the wall, to surrender without a terrible struggle. . . . They will fight like mad dogs before giving up." Today Hitler is still far from surrender. He is, however, facing a fourth bitter winter. Stalingrad stands. His war factories must be manned by slave power from the occupied lands. His people are apathetic and weary. His vast conquests have brought neither victory nor peace. A strategy of reprisal is a strategy of desperation, the act of a tyrant on the defensive. To say this is not to underestimate the dangers that lie ahead. But it is to discount utterly the hope of defeating this strategy by either of the methods so far attempted. However hard it is to look on while innocent prisoners suffer, we may as well accept the brutal fact that they cannot be helped except through the final defeat of the terrorists who are using torture as a political provocation.

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It's Not a Laissez Faire War

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, October 30

THERE are some extraordinary revelations in the latest report of the Tolan committee. Most of them reflect the planlessness that continues to be the principal characteristic of the war-production effort, despite the innumerable directives, the endless flow of orders, and the vast amount of paper work at the capital. Some elementary steps in effective organization of procurement, production, materials, and man-power have yet to be taken. Perhaps the most appalling single sentence in the entire report is this one: "No contract to date has carried with it a bill of material requirements and a time-production schedule."

The failure to gear materials to production has forced war contractors to grab and hoard what they could get. "Excessive inventories," the committee says, "have become the rule." But the inventories, though excessive, are not well balanced, and major contractors have surpluses in some materials, shortages in others. The gravity of the problem is indicated by the committee's estimate that not more than half of the increased steel production in 1940 and 1941 "went into military items and increased civilian production." The rest was hoarded.

More than a year ago the Tolan committee urged recapture of excessive inventories. It believes "an aggressive inventory policy could increase our material supplies of copper and steel by 50 per cent in the next six months." The chief of the WPB inventory branch reported that although there were probably about 400,000,000 pounds of copper in excess inventories, only 100,000,000 pounds had been reported and only 30,000,000 pounds taken over by the WPB. When Donald M. Nelson was before the committee he was asked why it took so long to recapture these inventories. His floundering attempt at a reply revealed the confused state of affairs in his organization. "Well, I cannot answer that," Nelson said. "It has taken too long, there is no doubt about it. It involved the setting up of a corporation, involved trying to evaluate these different products. We have done as good a job as we could have done on the recapturing of the inventories. I cannot say except that it has taken too long." This is not the answer of a man with a real grip on his job.

Lack of time-production schedules, like inadequate supervision of materials, has unbalanced the supply of war materials and their components. Production scheduling, if any, is largely in the hands of the individual producer, who tends to concentrate on items easiest to make. "Trucks and radios which closely resemble normal civilian products, for example, may run far ahead of schedule, while the tanks to which they are complementary lag behind." Each producer tries to fill his contract at maximum speed, but there is a lack of over-all scheduling to gear his output with that of other components: "Frames are completed without engines or instruments to make them into airplanes." This kind of scheduling is elementary in big business. The job of marshaling the flow of materials, parts, and sub-assemblies over the production and assembly lines is a basic one in General Motors or General Electric. G. M. cannot afford to be left at the end of the season with, let us say, 30,000 cowls and 100,000 radiators and 5,000 mudguards. Yet our war-production program today is out of balance in just this way. "Critical materials and labor time are tied up in components which do not make final assemblies: we have airplanes without propellors, guns without carriages, machine tools without spindles."

The WPB and Nelson do not have a monopoly on fumbling. The same slipshod management is evident in the agencies dealing with man-power. As the shortage of labor grows acute, it is more important to keep some men at their work bench than to put them in the armed forces. Yet the committee discovered that "Selective Service is making huge monthly drafts of men without any adequate machinery for occupational deferment." The armed services bid for man-power as they please. "During the past six months," the report says, "major aircraft concerns on the West Coast have lost thousands of workers through volunteering. Many of these men are highly skilled, and others are required temporarily to train workers being drawn into that expanding industry." Certain branches of the armed services insist, nevertheless, "upon drawing off the cream of the nation's youth through individual recruiting techniques and the use of preferential commissions." If the manufacturer could find out in advance what men he could keep and how long he could keep them, he could plan training programs to replace those he will lose, but the Selective Service boards "receive little advance notice of requirements" and are unable to provide the war contractor with this information.

Hoarding and poor planning are as evident in the case of man-power as in that of materials. The committee proposes that we adopt the British system of labor-supply inspectors, working out of regional man-power offices. Improper utilization of skills is as pernicious as hoarding, and both may be found in government arsenals and navy yards as well as in private plants. In one instance brought to the attention of the committee, "demand by a government plant for 200 machinists resolved

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itself upon analysis into need for a small number of machinists and various types of machine operators with much lower orders of skill." The committee believes that by reorganizing and rationalizing the use of labor within plants we can obtain the equivalent of a huge increase in man-power. Brigadier General Frank J. McSherry of the War Manpower Commission testified that in some plants productivity had been increased from 50 to 75 per cent by more efficient use of the labor force. The commission announced weeks ago that a force of labor inspectors would be established, but this has not yet been done, "though considerable time was spent in wrangling with the War Production Board over which agency would supervise the inspection system."

The man-power problem is made more difficult by the maldistribution of war orders and the construction of new facilities in new areas instead of the conversion of existing facilities. Here too there is confusion. "There is not today available within the federal government any single agency," the committee says, "which knows whether conversion has taken place at 30 or at 50 per cent efficiency." The committee found idle convertible facilities in both large and small business. "Whole areas, including both small and large cities, exist," the report declares, "which through mismanagement of contract letting and subcontracting are idle." The committee found this particularly true in the Middle West and New York City. Plans to concentrate civilian output in smaller plants in areas of labor surplus "continue to be shuffled back and forth between industry branches, industry advisory committees, and other sections of the War Production Board." Of the three concentration programs announced so far, "at least one has concentrated production in an area of labor shortage."

This lack of planning derives from laissez faire habits of mind. Nelson, as he explained to the committee, conceives of the WPB as an "umpire," settling disputes between various war and civilian agencies competing for materials. "We cannot expect to organize war production by using umpires," the Tolan report comments tartly, "any more than we can expect to operate a railroad system with umpires instead of schedules." The natural tendency is to think of the war-production program in terms of normal business. "War production," the committee says, "is treated as a salesman's proposition rather than as the mobilization of our entire national industrial plant for total war." The different parts of the government act like rival business firms. "In the absence of a program of production and an organization to coordinate it," the report declares, "we have today only a series of individual competing production projects. At virtually every point where coordination and planning should be exercised, we find competition and maneuvering. There is competition among the major branches of the military services. There is competition between the military services and the industry branches of the War Production Board. There is endless jockeying among the individual industry branches."

To carry on the war-production program in the image of the free market is only possible with a surplus of men, machines, and materials. We have a shortage of all three. One of the chief virtues of the Tolan report is that it sees man-power and materials and production and strategy as parts of one big problem, so closely interwoven by the necessities of total war that they cannot be dealt with separately. Without a decision on strategy, decisions cannot be made about man-power and munitions. The production needed to implement the strategy cannot be insured, in its turn, without man-power, materials, and production schedules. This is the frame of reference in which the Tolan committee opposes compulsory labor service; the problem is much too complicated to be solved by the bark of a labor sergeant.

The Tolan committee believes that the time has come for a reorganization of the war-production setup which will provide centralized supervision of men, machines, and materials. It proposes an Office of War Mobilization headed by a director. Under this there would be three offices—one the equivalent of a Ministry of Supply, the second to handle man-power, the third to control prices and wages. The first, the Office of War Supply, would take over the procurement divisions of army, navy, Maritime Commission, and lend-lease, as well as the functions of the War Production Board. Though mere organizational changes are often of dubious value, this one would have two advantages: it would give us a coordinated war effort, and it would finally take the job of procurement away from the armed services, which have enough to do and which have not demonstrated any genuine capacity for industrial mobilization. "The Director of War Mobilization would by this reorganization," the committee says, "assume for the first time the power to demand a significant detailed accounting from the armed services. He would become the agent for obtaining a statement of military requirements and for matching them against the capacity of our economy to deliver. The flow of materials, man-power, and machine facilities would become subject to his regulation."

The Tolan committee would have the war program planned, not "umpired." At the same time it understands that to plan is not the same as to regiment. Wise planning is not synonymous with centralization. If we finally begin to chart our course instead of allowing monopoly to muddle through, we can provide for much more participation and initiative on the part of the individual region, community, and plant than they have today. For the most important of our idle resources is the energy and enthusiasm that would be released by giving the worker, the independent business man, and the small town a more responsible role in the war program.

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Congress and the People

BY ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN

A BASIC principle of American political theory is now being sharply challenged. The legislative body, we have been accustomed to say, is more truly "representative" of us than is the executive or the judiciary. It has therefore a certain superiority over them. Our lawmakers, it is true, must recognize as equals in status the other branches of the government. For example, we speak of a "balance of powers" among these three. We have also devised methods of procedure by which they may "check" each other in various ways. And yet the essence of free, representative government has seemed to require that the Congress shall be, at least, "first among equals." The President may act. But fundamentally his action is limited to the execution of the decisions which "the representatives of the people" have made. The judges may rule and interpret. But the conclusions of the courts are not intended to add to or subtract from the explicit or implied meaning of the laws themselves. These limiting statements are, as all men know, open to question and even to qualification; but it remains true that in a peculiar sense the Senators and Representatives of our federal system "represent" the sovereign people. The will of the nation resides in the body of the legislature.

But nothing seems more obvious than the fact that the principle of which we are speaking, as a description of the actual processes of our national government, is no longer valid. The Congress is not, today, first among equals. It does not rank in public esteem and confidence above the executive and the judiciary. So far as representative character is concerned, it is commonly regarded as blocking and distracting the will of the people. We do not trust it to make wise and objective decisions furthering the general welfare. Apparently its action is wise only when it does what the executive or the voters tell it to do. It "plays politics" even when the winning of the war is at stake. Of course the same charges have been made against the executive and the judiciary, but the difference in degree at this point is so great that it becomes a difference in kind. Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Wallace, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Stimson, Mr. Nelson—whether one agrees with them or not—must be regarded as working desperately in the common interest. The Congress, on the other hand, seems to be regarded as an obstacle, as a body that must be cajoled, or frightened, or driven into actions that are essential for the realizing of the common purpose.

A striking and dramatic illustration of the drift of which I am speaking was found in President Roosevelt's recent "shotgun" message to Congress. In that message he declared that if the lawmaking body did not, before a certain date, take action toward an assigned end, he, as executive, would take the matter into his own hands. Further, in his Labor Day broadcast, he appealed to the people to support him in that intention. There can, I think, be little doubt that as the issue was then seen, the people stood by the President. And on the whole they are convinced that in the entire present situation he "represents" them. They are equally convinced that, in general, the Congress is failing to give expression to their will. American citizens may deplore that such apparent executive usurpation of authority should be necessary. But the plain common sense of a people is ready to declare that if, in a desperate emergency, one branch of the government fails to meet its responsibilities, some such action as that of the President in this case must be taken. We seem ready to say that, if necessary, Congress must be bludgeoned into doing its duty.

A second observation supporting my contention has to do with the general attitude of Americans toward their representatives. President Roosevelt, it must be noted, did not originate the shotgun method of handling Congressmen. We too deal with them by hold-up methods. We too threaten and demand. In our attempt to influence their action, it does not usually occur to us to present "reasons" to appeal to their judgment. We pile up mountains of telegrams and letters to terrify them. We impress upon them how many votes they will lose if they fail to do our will. Editors, columnists, advocates of causes good and bad seek to drive or lure them into submission. And in all this we do not seem to recognize that we are declaring them unfit to represent a free people. No man can represent the citizens of a democracy if he will change his mind, or change his vote without changing his mind, because of threats or pressure. And the fact that we deal with our Senators and Representatives in these terms shows all too clearly what we think of them. They are not our representatives; they are our messenger boys. And messenger boys as such, though they can deliver telegrams, are not fitted to represent the highest intelligence, the most resolute purpose, of a free people.

II

If what has been said is true, it is evident that our government is confronted with a constitutional crisis which is exceedingly difficult to interpret and, hence, to

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deal with. If it appears that our chosen representatives do not represent us, we have a desperate problem on our hands. Something fundamental to our scheme of government has slipped. And the difficulty of the problem is increased rather than diminished if we recognize, as I think we do, that the defect in the action of Congress is not primarily one of personnel but lies rather in the governing process itself. The basic trouble is not that unwise or corrupt men are elected to office. As the Congressional ranks now stand, unwisdom and corruption seem to be far overbalanced by ability and experience and devotion to the common welfare. The essential difficulty is that the moral and intellectual standards of the legislative body as a whole fall below those of the individual legislators. And to say that is to say that Congress does not "represent" even its own members. The political machinery by which men are elected or defeated, by which they are reelected or discarded, by which they keep in touch with their constituents, by which they do their work in committees and on the floor—all this machinery seems designed to make bad men effective and good men helpless. It gives representation to selfish desires and interests and prejudices. It does not, in any adequate degree, give representation to deliberate purposes and common intentions and reasoned judgments.

If the representative defect of the legislature does not lie in its personnel, where precisely does it lie? To answer that question we must ask what, in a democratic government, "representation" is of and for. In what sense, for example, is it true—as it undoubtedly is—that in the conflict over the control of prices, Mr. Henderson has been more representative of the will of the people than the farm bloc which stood in the way of his attempts to prevent inflation? What are the representatives of a free people expected to do and to be? The American answer to that question seems, at present, to have neither clarity nor validity.

III

Any agency which undertakes to act for the people has two tasks facing it. First, it must find out what the people want. It must discover and take account of the whole range of private interests which are at stake throughout the country. In this sense, every individual, every group, every region, has a right to representation in the councils of the government. And that representation must be equal, must be enjoyed without prejudice and without special privilege. But, second, since the huge conglomeration of a nation's desires and needs and intentions is riddled with conflict and contradiction, since interests are at war with one another, any representative body has another job to do. It must choose. It must think. It must discover the common good in all the separate goods. It must deny as well as affirm. In every case it must make sure that the greater good prevails over the lesser. As it does so, no genuine human interest of any individual or group may be ignored. But it is equally imperative that no private or public interest be allowed to have its way if it denies other interests which are found by impartial judgment to be more important.

Now the falling off of public confidence in the Congress is, I am sure, a popular recognition of the fact that our national lawmaking body is failing in both these fields of its responsibility. But the failure in the second field is far more extensive and disastrous than in the first. With some degree of adequacy the legislature does represent our wants. But as an agent of our thoughts the Congress is a misrepresentative body rather than a representative one.

In both fields American political philosophy has been drifting into a belief which has eaten away the integrity of our representative institutions. We have said that every interest, when expressed, becomes a vote. And we have taken this to mean that every vote expresses, in the last resort, an interest—and nothing more. The outcome of this theory has been that we have thought of the halls of Congress as a battleground. They are for us places where any interest may thrust itself forward, may demand and fight for such attention and acceptance as it can get.

This is the "pressure-group" theory of legislation, a theory which has given a basis for lobbying in all its vicious forms. According to it, each legislator is fighting for some interest or some set of interests, and in the free-for-all which results when all the interests meet in the common arena, he must see to it that "his" interests are persistently and cleverly promoted. The process of legislation thus becomes one of struggle and compromise and bargaining. In that struggle interests are not equally represented. The powerful, the selfish, the unscrupulous fight their way to dominance. The weak, the generous, the scrupulous are unheard and unheeded. The free-for-all of partisan strife does not give equal representation to all the interests of all the people.

But it is especially in the second field, where plans are to be made, where interests are to be measured, where purposes are to be woven into a coherent pattern, that the pressure-group theory has undermined the legislative process. It is here that the present-day legislator falls far short of the present-day judge or administrator. The President, as he watches over our national interests in war or in peace, cannot trust the blind struggle of conflicting interests to make his decisions for him. He must think and plan and decide. He must take into account all interests and must try to resolve their conflicts by means of deliberate and well-considered policy. So, too, the Supreme Court; so, too, Mr. Stimson, or Mr. Hull, or Mr. Nelson, or General Marshall. These men

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are responsible for the welfare of the nation as a whole. They must therefore study the forces at work and seek to control them. They must, as we like to say, "get tough" whenever private interest or individual stupidity stands in the way of the general welfare. But that means that they are doing what Congress is apparently unable to do. They are "deliberating." It is a curious and tragic reversal of the basic presuppositions of our scheme of government when it can be said that "deliberation" upon our common problems is to be found not in "the deliberative assembly" but in the courts of judicial decision and in the offices of executive administration.

IV

What shall we Americans do in the face of this constitutional crisis which has come upon us? There is no quick and ready answer to that question. The difficulty goes too deep for easy mechanical remedies. We cannot remove it merely by devising new political machinery. It rises out of our national understandings and misunderstandings of what freedom is and what government is. Very near to the source of it is the false theory of "localism" which has played such dreadful havoc in the field of American education. Appeal to that localism is today the favorite device of those who, with or without good conscience, fight for selfish advantage at the expense of the common good.

But these words are not written to offer a solution of the problem. Their purpose is, rather, to insist that the problem must be faced and studied by everyone who has regard for the basic principles of our government. First of all, we must recognize that our representative institutions have gone wrong. Our political smugness must be shattered. We owe many good things to the political genius of President Roosevelt, but I am inclined to believe that no action he has taken will prove to be more significant than his recent challenge to the legislative branch of the government. He challenged not primarily the control of prices but rather the efficiency and integrity of the process by which our laws are enacted. On an earlier occasion he issued a like challenge to the Supreme Court. That action was open to serious question, but this time he is clearly right. The representatives of the people must represent them. And they are not doing so.

One additional remark must be made. In my opinion, the principle of the primacy of the law-making body is fundamentally valid. The Congress must be first among equals. It must stand higher in public confidence than either the executive or the judiciary. And the practical question is: How can that principle be reestablished in our political life? If we are to have a government under law, then the making of the laws must be recognized as the expression of the highest intelligence, the most resolute purpose, of the people. Only as it meets that demand will Congress be restored to its proper place of dominance in our political life. Representative government rests not upon the freedom of our interests but upon the freedom of our minds. The basic question is: Can Congress, as a legislative body, represent the mind and will of America? Can Congress think—as a deliberative body must think if it is to take the lead in a government of equality and freedom?

Dulce et Decorum Est pro Batten Barton, Durstine, et Osborne Mori

Hymn to Victory, by a Sailor on Shore Leave

Hail to thee, Victory!
Victory dresses and Victory hats,
Victory camembert, Victory spats,
Victory coffee-bags, Victory milk,
Victory undies (much *better* than silk),
Victory doughnuts, they're shaped like a V,
Victory pants—not a cuff will you see,
Victory malteds to keep up your strength,
New cigarettes in a Victory length.
Science has leaped o'er the grimmest of hurdles:
Hail to the rubberless Victory girdles!
Double-size Victory bottles for booze!
Victory cocktails to lighten the news!
Try Viktori-Rub for that pain in your chest,
Eat Victory bread, Uncle Sam says it's best;
And when your lips murmur a prayer for the dead,
Be sure that your lipstick is Victory red.

Hey diddle diddle! Rome's burning, let's fiddle!
"Here's an idea, boys—hot off the griddle!
Looks like our sales are beginning to droop;
How about launching a Victory soup?
Red, white, and blue stripes all over the can,
Under the trademark a shot of Bataan;
Plaster the land from Seattle to Trenton
(Dignified copy, though—paintings by Benton).
Hang the expense, it would all go in taxes;
Here's the big tag—'In the Soup with the Axis!' "

. . . Oh, say, can you see, by the dawn's early light,
Sales going up, with the end not in sight,
Ads getting bigger and sales mounting higher,
Climbing like flames from a city on fire?
Hail to thee, Victory, goddess so fair,
Torch in the night of a sailor's despair,
Sent from on high to the land of the free
To replace Latakia and Vitamin B.
Victory, hear—when this struggle is past,
And the full, final triumph is ours at the last,
We'll leave to the billboards that name maledictory;
Whatever we call thee, we'll not call thee "Victory!"

HERMAN WOUK

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Americans Can't Be "Frozen"

BY THOMAS FOYLE

LET'S be honest with ourselves about this question of man-power. Involved in it are four uncomfortable facts which must be faced squarely before a satisfactory solution can be reached. These facts are:

1. There is a strong prejudice in many industries against employment of women, Negroes, Jews, aliens, and first-generation American citizens.

2. Public opinion is turning against the closed or union shop; and it is not easy to justify forcing a man to join a union because he works at a job which he has been forced to accept.

3. Wages are very unequal throughout the United States for jobs requiring comparable skill and physical effort.

4. Equalizing wages on a basis of skill and effort would require either an inflationary increase in total pay rolls or drastic reduction in the pay of certain skilled and strongly unionized workers.

Unless the war is won sooner than anyone has a right to expect, these four facts will interfere seriously with the production necessary to win the war. At best, solutions for the problems they present cannot be found before much damage has been done. If they are not dealt with soon, victory may be long delayed, and if they are not dealt with at all, victory in war may mean defeat for decency and progress in the reaction which will come with peace.

Prejudice against women and minority groups is slowly giving way before the pressure of circumstances. Few employers are so reactionary that they will turn away business rather than change their employment policies, and from now on most employers will have to take any workers they can get or do without workers. The problem will be chiefly to guarantee fair and equal treatment for the new employees. Even though there is likely to be a revival of prejudices after the war, there will be some net gain in tolerance, as there was the last time.

The union question is more delicate. If there is a draft of man-power by federal legislation, Congress will be under tremendous pressure to include a provision which would outlaw the closed shop at least so far as new workers are concerned, and there is a good chance that all closed or union-shop contracts will be voided for the duration. An unyielding attitude by union leaders on this point might easily lead them to disaster. Now is a time for political realism, not for stubborn clinging to principles which were developed when the nation was at peace and unions were struggling for a toe-hold in mass-production industries. Every poll of public opinion indicates that the newspaper campaign against strikes in war industries, dishonest as it is on the basis of statistics, has been widely effective. In the long run the unions stand to gain far more by voluntary action which would disarm hostility than by a last-ditch battle for their abstract rights, whether they win or lose.

Nor is political expediency the only reason why unions should act with some caution in war time. The economic and moral justifications for a union shop of the traditional type are largely lacking when wages and working conditions are fixed by government decree. Collective bargaining has been virtually suspended, for reasons accepted by an overwhelming majority of the American people, and for the duration the chief function of unions has been wholly changed. Their contribution to war production in providing a mechanism for adjustment of grievances, in making suggestions for greater efficiency, and in reporting bad management practices to government authorities and to the public is of the greatest value. But it would be hard to argue that this contribution depends upon a closed or union shop.

On the other hand, the unions have every right to insist that the war should not be made an excuse to sabotage the gains they have already made, or to train millions of potential scabs. Union leaders have an opportunity for constructive leadership in suggesting a solution to this problem which would win public support without sacrificing the principles of unionism. They might, for example, offer memberships to emergency war workers with nominal dues, and might even consider allowing non-union workers to be employed in closed shops if union rights were properly safeguarded by long-term contracts. The unions have much to gain by offering temporary concessions of their own free will, and everything to lose if they offer nothing. They are now dealing primarily with public opinion rather than with employers—whose labor costs in the heavy industries are largely paid by the government—and it will be tragic if they fail to adjust their actions accordingly.

Moreover, the unions particularly and labor in general have an opportunity today which transcends any program for standing pat on the gains of the last ten years. For the first time since the Industrial Revolution conditions are becoming ripe for labor solidarity based on equal pay for equal work throughout a whole nation. The stumbling-block to labor unity for sixty years has been the fact that the privileged classes of labor could not join the rest without losing their special advantages. Skilled workers had a stake in existing conditions,

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not only in their own higher wage rates, but also because sweatshop conditions in non-union industry kept down the prices of the shirts and food and luxuries for which they spent their money.

Today, prices are frozen. The threat of inflation is being used as an argument to freeze wage rates also. But

Paul V. McNutt

farm labor and poorly paid labor generally will not stay put when jobs go begging at high wages in shipyards, plane factories, arsenals. The notion that men can be frozen to their jobs when much more money is offered elsewhere borders on the fantastic; Americans are not built that way, and neither persuasion nor force will keep them in one place when they can do better somewhere else.

In sober terms of war production, over a period of more than a few months, the idea is hopeless. Preventing a man from taking advantage of opportunity is so wholly contrary to American tradition and to every statement of the aims for which the war is being fought that it is hard to accept it as the suggestion of a sane person. It is, quite literally, a proposal to freeze the *status quo ante bellum,* and that is most certainly not what we are fighting for. There is something monstrous in this delusion that the way to win the war is to keep everyone, except those drafted into the army, exactly where he is now. It is equally reactionary to propose that men and women should be shifted from one job to another without regard to the rates of pay.

But how can wages be equalized on a fair basis without starting a cycle of inflation which would be disastrous to the middle-income groups who hold the balance of political power? More specifically, how can the United States provide adequate incentive for the production of food without raising the price of subsistence beyond the means of four families out of five?

These questions must be answered not only in relation to winning the war, but also in relation to conditions after the war. If it is the intention of the people of the United States to keep on paying farm labor much less than industrial labor—and to pay textile labor much less than automobile labor—then the chances are that the war inflation and post-war deflation of twenty-five years ago will be repeated. The pressure of labor supply and demand during the next year will blow the lid off any attempt to keep the arbitrary differentials between various wages and prices exactly as they are today. There is no justice in many of the existing wage differentials, and there is no logic in many of the existing price differentials. Sentimental arguments about soldiers fighting and dying for $50 a month will not long carry weight in a country where more than one-third of the families have less than $50 a month clear above room and board, and another third have a hard struggle to make ends meet.

For the moment, the United States is still enjoying war prosperity. The stores are well stocked with goods no longer being produced. Unemployment is disappearing. But real hardship and the impact of a new tax bill are just around the corner. When the people begin to feel the blow, they will not take kindly to a freezing of conditions which are not, as they thought, the conditions of November, 1942. When the full meaning of this war hits them in their pocket-books and in their standards of living, their anger against a program which purported to keep things as they are today will grow in intensity, and it may turn in any direction. Talk about equality of sacrifice means nothing yet, because there has been little real sacrifice. But when the United States faces both casualty lists and lack of consumers' goods next year, the gross inequities of wages and prices frozen at current levels may gravely disrupt this country.

There is no serious demand for dead-level equality, for paying the cotton picker or the loom tender exactly the same wage as the skilled mechanic. At the same time there is an increasing realization that many of the cotton pickers and loom tenders are quite capable of becoming skilled mechanics in a few months, and these workers are not likely to accept a 1,000 per cent difference in wages if at the same time they are denied the right to become mechanics. Since we must have cotton pickers and loom tenders to win the war, the only alternatives are to pay them more or to keep them in their places by force. No matter what pretty words man-power stabilization is dressed up in, it comes down to one of those two things.

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And keeping Americans in their places by force—even by vote of Congress—is not likely to win the war unless we have the improbable luck to win a full victory before the people know what has been done to them.

To win the war, and to win the peace after the war, a flexible system of adjusting wages, prices, and employment is infinitely preferable to any attempt to freeze them. To be honest about it, a flexible system would mean some inflation—the degree depending upon the skill with which it was handled—and the political tides are all against that at the present moment. Middle-class families with comparatively fixed incomes are in the saddle. They are not only numerous enough to be effective, but sufficiently justified in their fear of a run-away depreciation of the dollar which would wipe them out to have the support of poorer people with a sense of fair play. Unfortunately, they do not see that their attempt to stand without bending at all may lead to a break which will destroy them completely. The sentiments of the political leaders who are trying to achieve wage and price stabilization are praiseworthy, but the effort to postpone adjustment of gross inequalities of wages and salaries until after the war is likely to lose the war. Liberals, radicals, and reactionaries in the United States have apparently reached a curious agreement on a war economy which has no resemblance to either laissez faire or socialism and no virtue except that it puts a sudden stop to argument. But it will not do.

The United States in its war economy can easily afford to make adjustments in wage rates which will satisfy workers compelled to stay in the jobs where they are most needed. Obviously wage rates should be adjusted upward wherever necessary, and where necessary, prices should be adjusted upward to meet the increased wages. Moderate relative increases in some prices will provide a basis for a much sounder economy after the war, and any inflationary tendency caused by increased wage payments which are not compensated for by the moderately higher prices of such commodities as food and textiles can be adjusted by generally increased taxes.

The proposal is not utopian. Workers as a whole will be satisfied if reasonable adjustments are made. Full adjustment is a long-range problem to be dealt with after the war. But it should not take an extended argument to prove that there will be more war production if some wage adjustments are made, to correspond with war man-power needs, than if men are told arbitrarily to work at certain jobs for whatever those jobs pay.

For the moment, the war man-power picture seems to have got badly out of focus, with a lot of emotionalism about draftees and the horrors of inflation. In perspective, it becomes a natural part of the economic changes which everyone accepts in theory as a consequence of the war. The odd thing is that so many people expect the economic consequences to wait until the war is over.

In the Wind

A MOVIE SHORT now being shown in theaters throughout the country contains an appeal for scrap material by Donald Nelson and numerous pictures intended to convince the audience that steel and rubber shortages are an immediate obstacle to all-out production. Another being shown simultaneously in some houses warns against loose talk. One example of this, it says, is the story that we may lose the war because we are short of raw materials. Actually we have all we need, says the commentator, and the film shows huge stockpiles of steel and rubber.

THE LOS ANGELES *TIMES*, which favored the reelection of Representative Leland Ford, a leader of the anti-labor forces in Congress, defended its position on military grounds. It would be unfair to the army, the paper said, to relieve it of such a vigorous and capable young officer as Lieutenant Will Rogers, Jr., Ford's opponent, by electing him to public office. And it would be harmful to the morale of parents whose sons have been drafted to allow soldiers to return to civilian life merely by being elected to Congress.

THIS COLUMN on October 24 cited "rumors in Washington" to the effect that A. A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, was about to become a Catholic. We have the best possible authority for reporting that these rumors, though persistent, are unfounded; that Mr. Berle was baptized a Congregationalist and expects to stay one.

A WRITER in a Brussels Nazi paper laments the refusal of some Belgian mayors to register babies who have been christened with German names. "I have heard," he wrote, "that some mayors refuse to allow Germanic names to be given to our children. But what could be more beautiful than a name like Erwin, which means 'man of honor,' or Oswald, which means 'holy power'?"

CITY COLLEGE in New York, which once was the center of agitation against military training for undergraduates, now has the largest volunteer R. O. T. C. unit in the country—3,157 members.

GAS RATION COUPONS sell at about fifty cents a piece in the black markets on the East Coast.

ASKED FOR A STATEMENT on a murder believed to be the work of a Negro, Governor Paul B. Johnson of Mississippi said: "I'm doing everything I can to locate that Negro murderer and to see that he is . . . given the benefit of as fair and impartial a trial as would be given to any Negro charged with murder."

[*The $5 prize for the best item received in October goes to Girolamo Valenti of New York City for his quotation from Clare Booth Luce, "There was a time when we all thought Mussolini was doing a good job," published October 31.*]

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American Progressives—Your Hour

WITHOUT indulging in the delusion that the peoples of the earth are fighting to establish the American Century or that America alone should order the march of the democratic coalition, it is certain that no other nation can so dominate the outcome of the present struggle as the United States. That is what gives the question of America's position on the problems of the war and the peace such overwhelming importance. To rise to its task, this country must liquidate the last vestiges of isolationism and substitute a constructive and bold democratic foreign policy.

Pearl Harbor put an end to isolationism in its most virulent form. Among his political opponents Roosevelt lost to the Axis his place as Enemy No. 1, though only to become Enemy No. 2. The slogan "Better Hitler Than the People's Front," had been so closely identified in France with the betrayals of the Pétains and Lavals that after Pearl Harbor the American isolationists dared not openly adapt it for domestic use. "Better Hitler than the New Deal" could become a respectable public expression only in the eventuality of a negotiated peace. For the moment it was not a platform on which even a Hamilton Fish would feel entirely comfortable.

But we must not deceive ourselves. Isolationist thinking survived the terrific shock of December 7. In one way it is natural that this should be so. Even among the best Americans the tradition of the long period preceding the First World War was still alive—that period in which America's political and economic development followed its own energetic course, rather removed from that of the rest of the world. Suddenly, in 1917, the United States plunged into the struggle of the nations and within a year turned the tide in favor of the Allies. Nothing was better calculated to liquidate the isolationism of the previous century. But hardly had the last shot been fired in Europe than America again withdrew into its traditional detachment.

Twenty years later neither the terrific lesson of 1939-40, with the destruction of a dozen independent nations and the immediate menace of an attack on England, nor the Nazi penetration in Latin America was sufficient to induce certain American elements to abandon their isolationism. Isolationism, in fact, showed itself capable of resisting every reality. The Hitler war was a world war, all right, not only because the fighting engulfed one continent after another, but because for the first time in history a nation and a regime openly promised to make good the megalomaniac dream of world domination. American planes flying to Europe in eight or nine hours without landing liquidated a part of the isolation. The other side of the coin was also visible to everyone. In the same number of hours European planes could fly to New York. The plane led the way, arguing the interventionist case. Policy followed, hesitating. And more hesitating still, the general thinking of a country of 130,000,000.

But let us suppose isolationism definitely overcome. There remains the second part of the problem. The mere fact of ceasing to be isolationist does not make a foreign policy democratic. In the case of the United States the main danger lies in the absence of an organized left to fight efficiently for a progressive foreign policy. Though they agree in their general position, the groups of intellectual liberals are disconnected. Labor was until recently predominantly isolationist. Today its interest in world affairs has deepened in a most encouraging way. But labor is not yet a force that influences the foreign policy of the United States. With all its millions of organized workers, American labor has not the strength and perhaps not even the desire to force its way into the inner councils of government as has British labor. If the American labor movement were to take the same interest in international problems that it takes in trade-union problems, an army of eight million organized workers would be decisive in the waging of political war.

To create a popular basis, not in terms of emotion, but of political efficiency, for a foreign policy oriented toward a people's peace is the immense task that confronts American liberals and labor leaders. It is their hour. And it would be most encouraging if such groups were to come forward with some concrete proposal that would give their intervention a realistic quality. The first and most important change to introduce in the present situation is the creation of an Inter-Allied Political Council to conduct the war as a war of the people. We are convinced that the struggle itself will impose the creation of such a council—whether with the will of the leaders of the United Nations or against their will. We are convinced of this because the alternative is defeat, and as we have said many times, the peoples are not going to allow themselves to be defeated only because of the obstinacy or the routine conservatism of their leaders. The creation of a council now could spare the democracies many disasters. A delay of six months or a year may lead to a situation in which the first task of the council would be not to wage political war against the Axis, but to reestablish peace between the United Nations themselves.

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Biddle's Order: Two Views

A BLOW FOR FREEDOM

BY CARLO SFORZA

ATTORNEY GENERAL BIDDLE'S speech on Columbus Day, with its announcement that the six hundred thousand Italian citizens living in this country were no longer to be regarded as "enemy aliens," was an act of grand strategy. Once more it has been demonstrated that the best diplomacy is courageous generosity—at least in a conflict which is not a war of nation against nation but of progress against black reaction, of human aspiration against brutality. It is a long time since anything has so deeply stirred the five million American citizens of Italian parentage and the forty-five million Italians in Italy.

Mussolini

Only one other event, occurring a few weeks earlier, created in Italy a sensation nearly as profound. That was the Pan-American Conference of Free Italians which met in Montevideo, a city sacred to Italian hearts, since it was from the banks of the Plata that our national hero Garibaldi set forth ninety-six years ago to proclaim the republic in Rome. What most impressed Italian public opinion on that occasion was that the four hundred delegates, representing millions of Italians living in the two Americas, were not content merely to issue some solemn proclamation, but by unanimous action gave me a mandate to establish an Italian National Committee to represent not only the Italians abroad but also the voiceless Italians in Italy; and gave to Randolfo Pacciardi, likewise unanimously, a mandate to organize a Free Italian Legion, which may mean more for victory than a whole army since it will be a legion of Italian volunteers—like the "Thousand" with whom Garibaldi landed in Marsala to set southern Italy free.*

The angry outbursts of the Rome radio prove that the two events made a very strong impression even in ordinarily silent official Italy. The Fascist policy heretofore has been to pretend to ignore attacks on Italy from abroad; but after Montevideo the Fascists felt obliged to discard their Olympian attitude. The demonstration had been too moving, too unanimous. How was it possible to reiterate, "They are traitors, they are Communists," when, speaking in Montevideo, I was surrounded not only by enthusiastic workers but by heroes of the First World War, by descendants of famous Italian statesmen, and by great industrialists?

In the case of Mr. Biddle's speech fascism and its public-relations gang were even more at a loss. They knew before the Montevideo conference that it had been planned; they were prepared for the worst. But in a speech by a foreign statesman they thought they could count on finding phrases which, delicately and skilfully distorted, would provoke skepticism and sarcasm among Italians. This had happened with Churchill's famous broadcast on December 23, 1940, when he said to my compatriots, "This is where one man, and one man alone, has led you." The Italians wondered then whether London was offering them a "decent fascism without Mussolini"; and since they knew that Mussolini was no worse than the rest of his infamous group, and since they despised his "moderate" supporters and accomplices quite as much as they did him, Churchill's speech resulted only in a long period of sulky dissatisfaction with the Allies—though I have reason to believe that the interpretation placed upon his words was not what the British Prime Minister meant.

Biddle's speech, however, left no opportunity for misinterpretation. That is why the Rome radio has not even tried to answer it but has only stammered the old idiotic stories about the "Judeo-capitalist-bolshevist" alliance.

It is difficult for anyone outside Italy to understand what the removal of the "enemy alien" stigma from Italians in the United States means to Italians at home. In almost every city and village of southern Italy and in the valleys of Piedmont and Liguria there are relatives of these residents of the United States. Now the Attorney General has told them that of the 600,000 Italians living in America it was necessary to intern as dangerous only 228. As Biddle said, "It means that the revolt against Italian fascism cannot be kept down, that it has already started, that here . . . in American factories, Italians—thousands upon thousands of them—are already in revolt against the government of Mussolini. . . . It means that with their own hands they are hastening his defeat!"

Italians who have always remained loyal to the ideals of free Italy can now add: The revolt against fascism started by the Italians of America will be brought to a victorious conclusion by the people of Italy. The creation

*An article on the Free Italian Legion by Randolfo Pacciardi appeared in the Political War section for October 3.

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Morale

Juan Romero, recently escaped from Spain, has just arrived in New York after a dangerous journey as an unlisted passenger on various cargo ships. A countryman of his, a former member of the Loyalist diplomatic service, who came from the same small village near Malaga where Juan was born, could hardly wait to show his fellow-townsman the wonders of Manhattan. Juan was impressed but not awed by Rockefeller Center. He admired the Henry Hudson Highway and Riverside Drive, but he had not forgotten how the sun plays on the waters of Malaga. The cafeteria in Forty-second Street excited him at first—there was more food on its counters than you could find in fifty restaurants in Madrid. But after all, one gets used to doing without food.

Only one thing, so far, has really captivated Juan. His friend noticed that every time he dropped into the hotel he opened the large closet and stood gazing into it with wondering eyes.

"What is the matter with you? Do you need clothes?"

Juan shook his head. "In Madrid," he explained, "I was in hiding for eighteen months. Most of the time I stayed in the closet—there were visitors and the police. It was narrow, like an ataud *(coffin). But if I had had a closet like this nobody could have dragged me out of Madrid. I would have stayed there till the shooting started again!"*

of an Italian National Committee will hasten the arrival of this moment. (I am free to say this, for I reap no personal gain from the task which the conference imposed upon me.) As soon as a National Committee is created and receives tangible evidence that the Allies are fighting not for the humiliation of Italy but for the destruction of fascism, all Italians will feel that they may rise at last without any of those inner doubts which are so hard for simple, honest people to reconcile in a civil struggle. The National Committee will be the trustee for the silenced people of Italy, but when victory comes it will not impose decisions and choices on the Italians: the future government of Italy will be chosen by the people in Italy. If the United Nations would now establish some sort of official contact with the committee, it would be a wise and farsighted act of political war.

May I point out, parenthetically, a secondary consequence of such action, one which would be of greater importance to the United States than to Italy. An Italian National Committee, speaking responsibly to Italy from the free shores of America, would play its part in eliminating some of the persistent pro-Axis sympathy which still exists among certain groups of American citizens of Italian origin, or even of Mayflower origin—groups in no way affected by Biddle's speech. What I see now in California I saw in identical form in New York and Boston: silent but by no means harmless ladies and gentlemen who buy war bonds but who whisper among themselves, "Let us wait, the real enemy is Russia; some day a new alignment will take shape: the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and perhaps Germany—all against Russia and Japan."

This is a whispering campaign against which the FBI is powerless, because the whisperers assert—and some even believe—that they are patriots. Along with its other evils, this campaign, which is certainly known to the Russians, provides sustenance for the Soviet "persecution complex"—a phenomenon which may seem strange to Americans but is certainly not without psychological justification when we remember the farsighted Neville Chamberlain, the loyal Georges Bonnet, and the other participants in the Munich fraud.

The action of the United States in regard to the Italians living here is tantamount to classing Italy with the other enslaved nations of Europe. But not to proceed farther, not to give the Italian nation a symbol and a banner—such as a National Council and a fighting Legion would be—might mean prolonging the period of hesitation among honest Italians in Italy.

To proceed no farther might also be harmful to the United States in Latin America, where Italians are so influential politically and economically. Let us not forget that at the inter-American conference at Rio President Castillo of Argentina used the supposed sentiment of the Italians in his country as a screen to hide his pro-Axis policy and to oppose the diplomatic stand of Sumner Welles. The Montevideo conference gave Castillo the lie: it showed what the Italians of Latin America really think and feel. Therefore it might be risky to disillusion the millions of Italians there who fervently believe in a new war of Italian independence hand in hand with the United States.

GOOD BUT NOT ENOUGH

BY GAETANO SALVEMINI

THE first good stroke in political warfare against Mussolini was made by Attorney General Biddle when he took Italians in the United States out of the ranks of enemy aliens. The United States has now told Italians all over the world that American democracy is fighting Mussolini and the Fascists and not the Italian people. The news will have tremendous impact not only in Italy but also in South America, where there are two million people of Italian extraction.

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But in the United States the Attorney General's decision, though in itself it must be warmly applauded, will have harmful consequences if it is not coupled with another measure. The government should announce that proceedings have been initiated to deprive of their citizenship certain prominent persons of Italian extraction who have taken part in Fascist activities during these last years, thus showing that their oath of allegiance to the American Constitution was taken with mental reservations.

All Fascist agents for the past twenty years have been teaching citizens and residents of Italian origin in this country that "democracy" is stupid, gullible, and inefficient, and that it can be challenged by anyone without danger. If the stigma of "enemy aliens" is removed and nothing more done to give evidence that "democracy" knows how to be firm when necessary, generosity will be construed as stupidity.

Attorney General Biddle has provided the Fascist agents—who are still active and aggressive everywhere—with a fresh argument discrediting "democracy." "At last," they are telling simple-minded people, "we have won our point. We are always in a position to dictate our will to Washington. We have demanded that the Italians be no longer regarded as enemy aliens. And we have got what we wanted."

There is no need for hecatombs. No more than two or three score people out of one million Italians in New York, half a dozen in Boston, a dozen in Chicago, should be singled out. But they should be taken from among the big shots and not from among the small fry, and the widest possible publicity should be given to their names and their punishment. To deprive of his citizenship some braggart like Domenico Trombetta when the highest leaders of the Fascist movement are left undisturbed, even kept in key positions, will lead nowhere.

Behind the Enemy Line

BY ARGUS

THE political strategists of Berlin have had ample opportunity recently to ring changes on the theme of the disunity among the United Nations. Such demonstrations as the demand for a second front or the editorial in *Life* have not escaped them. For weeks they have been passionately reminding the Russians of the treachery of the London plutocrats, and the English of the arrogance of the Moscow bolsheviks. When speaking to America they have, pro *Life,* denounced the perfidious egotism of the British; and when speaking to the countries of the British Empire, they have, contra *Life,* declaimed against the self-seeking perfidy of the Yankees. It was inevitable. The chief aim of Nazi foreign propaganda is to strengthen any tendency toward mutual dislike or distrust among the various members of the United Nations.

The dissensions of the Allies have also been a favorite topic with the German people during the past few weeks. All through October the press and the domestic radio have resounded with it. It is said not only that each of the Allies is completely indifferent to the war the others are waging, but that each is carrying on a Machiavellian war against the others. That is the situation between the "Anglo-Saxons" and the Russians, and even more markedly between the Americans and the English. America is fighting only a nominal war against Germany—as camouflage. Its real purpose, the motive underlying all its acts, is to destroy the British Empire and inherit its lands.

It is fantastic, the incidents that are seized on to make the German people believe in this shadow war of "American imperialism" against Great Britain. Secretary Knox made a statement that the American navy would soon be the largest in the world. What did he mean by the largest, and what did he mean by soon? Simply that America intends to take over the British fleet and incorporate it in its own navy. Word has been received—false or true—that the American government has been granted the use of a railroad in Canada. That means, of course, that "sooner or later Canada will be swallowed up by the United States."

One wonders whether such stories—provided that they find credence—arouse any interest or emotion. Probably not. To the average German today nothing seems of less importance than which flag is finally going to wave over Canada or what will be the future relationship between England and the United States. However, a propaganda which is active twenty-four hours a day must sometimes use rather unpromising material.

Whether the fantastic story of anti-British American imperialism is accepted as true is another question. Obviously its inventors assume that at least part of their public will believe at least part of the tale. It is a fact that some Germans tend to view any alliance between states as a mask for attempts to swindle each other. During the First World War many informed persons, addicted to this brand of realism, were wholly convinced that the English could never be turned out of Calais. Published documents show that Marshal Hindenburg, for example, was of this opinion. At the end of September, 1918, when Ludendorff proposed that Germany ask for an armistice, Hindenburg answered, "But we must lay down the condition that the English shall not keep Calais." Ludendorff interrupted him harshly: "It is not the time for that now." For four years the Field Marshal had been convinced that the ultimate purpose of France's ally, England, was to despoil France.

This throws light on how certain groups in Germany conceive of their own obligations toward their allies.

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G. E. F. (Ilium)

BY JOEL SAYRE

SAMUEL BUTLER, that perverse man, once argued that the "Odyssey" was written by a young woman. Well, whoever Homer was or wasn't, a young woman surely did not write the "Iliad." Whoever had the final say on the "Iliad" had been to the wars. He had been in battle, and he knew how it looked and smelled and sounded and felt. In their sharpness of detail, both visual and emotional, great chunks of the "Iliad" seem as modern as the finest Hemingway. Yes, I would bet any money he had been in many a battle, this fellow who put the "Iliad" together, for he knew all the gear, and how the men talk when they are sore at each other, and all the old soldier tricks. As they say in the Marine Corps, he was salty. What a combat correspondent!

These Greek troops—they had been on this front nine years, remember—are as genuine as the characters in "What Price Glory." You might argue that they themselves were marines, for they were at home on board ship, too. They are brave in battle, homesick out of it, interested in equipment—Homer stops his story a long time for an almost microscopic description of Achilles's armor—and in girls, food, drink, sports. As for their serious side, exactly as Catholic soldiers in the field nowadays are careful about their religious duties, so the more pious Greeks would not think of neglecting their proper sacrifices and prayers. And when anybody gets hit, Homer gives it to us the way it was, in close-up slow motion.

Besides all this wonderful reporting, which could take some cutting in spots, there are characters you can't forget: Thersites, the silly, chattering guardhouse lawyer who has been found in every outfit that ever fought in any war; Odysseus, the smart operator, greatest master of strategy *or* tactics in the whole campaign; Diomedes of the loud war cry, who in civil life raised man-eating horses; Nestor, the first Old Soldier in literature, endlessly complaining that he can't understand what's got into these kids of 1183 B. C.—when he was their age, men were men; Helen, the War Aim, who kept insisting to the Trojans, "You must think I'm terrible!"; Patroclus, the young squire of Achilles, who, sulking in his tent, couldn't stand it any more when the Greeks began to get their brains kicked out and rushed back into battle to save the day and the war and be killed; Chryseïs of the Fair Cheeks and Briseïs of the Fair Cheeks, the two Charmaines that caused all the trouble between Achilles and Agamemnon, a stupid boothead of a man if there ever was one; poor old Priam, father of Hector and forty-nine other sons; and Paris, the pretty boy, whom his brother, great Hector, caught strutting and wenching back in the city when every man was needed in the lines.

But what makes you positive that Homer was in the field himself was the way he understood fear. Take the great scene near the close where Achilles has driven all the Trojans back into the city except Hector, who stands there in front of the gates. His mother, Hecuba, and old Priam plead with him piteously, but he won't move; he just waits there while the terrible Achilles runs toward him. Then this superb Homer goes inside Hector's mind and gives him a short, sad day dream as he watches Achilles come closer and closer. What would happen if he took off his armor and laid aside his spear and stepped out, offering to shake hands? Suppose he made Paris give Helen back to Menelaus and all the riches he stole with her, and they agreed to throw in half the city of Troy for reparations. Why wouldn't that be the way to end this awful thing? But then he takes another look at Achilles, sees his face and the smoke pouring out of his shinguards, and he knows he has just been thinking foolishness.

Suddenly his nerve snaps. He turns and runs, and with Priam and Hecuba and all the Trojans watching from the walls, he is chased by the swift-footed Achilles. Then Hector gets hold of himself and turns to make his last stand. He puts up a great fight, a fight that he should have won; but it is down for him to die, and as he dies he asks Achilles please to send his body back to his family. But Achilles says, "The only family that'll be at your funeral, Jack, will be the dog family and the vulture family." So Hector says, "All right, you iron-hearted bastard. You're living on borrowed time yourself. I hope you know it's all set for Paris to get you. Ha ha, my silly little brother, Paris. That's a good one, that is." He dies. Achilles strips the armor off him, and then the other Greeks come up and stick their spears in him, one after the other.

Achilles is spoiled, selfish, swollen-headed, and lacking in team spirit, like a star athlete who goes on strike because he thinks he isn't appreciated, but you never have any trouble believing how good he is once he gets going. Even when he battles a whole river in torrent, you somehow believe it. If you saw that in a movie, what a sequence it would make!

The "Iliad" is also a poem, in case anybody has forgotten. Achilles is trying to cremate Patroclus. He has put his dead friend on the pyre with horses and cattle

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and a dozen young Trojans for kindling, but he can't get the fire lighted:

> But the pyre of the dead Patroclus kindled not. Then fleet-footed Achilles had a further thought: standing aside from the pyre he prayed to the two winds of the North and West, and promised them fair offerings, and pouring libations from a golden cup besought them to come, that the corpses might blaze up speedily in the fire and the wood make haste to be enkindled. Then Iris, when she heard his prayer, went swiftly with the message to the winds. They, within the house of the West Wind, were feasting all together at meat, when Iris sped thither and halted on their threshold of stone. And when they saw her with their eyes, they sprang up and called to her, everyone to sit by him. But she refused to sit and spoke her word: "No seat for me; I must get back to the streams of the Ocean, to the Ethiopians' land where they sacrifice hecatombs to the immortal gods, that I too may feast at their rites. But Achilles is praying to the North Wind and to the loud West Wind to come, and promising them fair offerings, that ye may make the fire be enkindled whereon lieth Patroclus, for whom all the Achaians are making moan."
>
> She having thus said, departed, and they rose with a mighty sound, rolling the clouds before them. And swiftly they came blowing over the sea, and the waves rose beneath their shrill blast; and they came to deep-soiled Troy and fell upon the pyre, and loudly reared the mighty fire. So all night drave they the flames of the pyre together, blowing shrill; and all night the fleet Achilles, holding a two-handled cup, drew wine from a golden bowl, and poured it forth and drenched the earth, calling upon the spirit of the hapless Patroclus.

Can We Win with Planes?

BY DONALD W. MITCHELL

IN A period which has seen only moderate naval and air activity and fighting by less than 1 per cent of the troops in our army, blueprints for defeating the Axis have appeared by the score. A campaign in the North Pacific, an invasion of Italy, a land offensive against Japan on the continent of Asia, victory through air power, and even psychological warfare have all had their more or less able advocates. The furor over strategy has produced a few weighty books, several brilliant defenses of military get-rich-quick schemes, and a fair amount of trash.

Most of these books plead a special cause, the use of some one weapon or line of attack. They offer air power *or* land power *or* sea power as the way to victory rather than all three. Because the air-power enthusiasts are the most vocal and persuasive of these special pleaders, it may be useful to survey the role of the airplane in the war to date.

World War II has developed two major uses for the airplane. First, it can be employed in the capacity foreseen by General "Billy" Mitchell and the Italian General Douhet and championed in recent years by Major de Seversky and Al Williams—that is, as a long-range striking weapon which can either win a war alone or so greatly damage economic life and morale as to make subsequent mopping up by army or navy a comparatively simple matter. The current bombing offensive of the Royal Air Force is an example of this use of air power, as was the Luftwaffe's unsuccessful all-out attack on England in 1940. Secondly, air power can be used as an extension of other forces. It played this role in the battles of Midway and the Coral Sea, and on land was a component part of a victory team in the German conquests of Poland and France and Rommel's defeat of the British in Libya last summer.

A study of the war to date shows us in which of these capacities it has been most effective. As an independent striking force air power has to its credit the destruction of ships, bases, cities, and industries, but it has never dealt a decisive blow. In the German counter-blockade of England, airplanes, despite great geographical advantages, have been only one-fourth as destructive as submarines. The current air offensive over western Germany has enjoyed many advantages—it has had large targets at close range and met inferior defending planes—but the undoubted devastation it has wrought has not crippled Germany's production centers, transportation, or armed forces. Whether it can do so in the future is a question yet unanswered.

On the other hand, as a cooperating force air power has usually been decisive. The exceptions are few. In Libya Rommel defeated an enemy superior in air power but failing to coordinate it effectively with ground forces; in the Burma fighting the A. V. G. for some time held the whiphand over the Japanese air forces, yet the British were steadily pushed back by the invading army. But in most instances an army that has lost command of the air or a naval force whose protecting umbrella of air power has been destroyed is earmarked for defeat.

Air power today is operating in four main theaters—

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Egypt, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and the Pacific. The Pacific is, of course, so vast as to include many lesser arenas. What are the conditions in each of these areas, and what may we expect of air power?

In Egypt the United Nations have had air superiority for at least a year. They have employed their airplanes as an independent striking force—with moderate success—and as a cooperating unit as well. In the first capacity the R. A. F. has hindered the shipment of supplies across the Mediterranean, sinking or crippling a number of ships and badly damaging harbor installations and supply dumps. But though its activities in this field have been of considerable value, they have not compensated for its failure to act in concert with the Army of the Nile. The stunning British defeats of early summer would almost certainly not have occurred had the troops benefited from the aerial reconnaissance and received the close support in battle which the superiority of the R. A. F. made perfectly feasible. The last-ditch stand of the British army before Alexandria was due in no small measure to a change in aerial tactics: the fliers were directed to put cooperation with the army before the bombing of military targets, no matter how tempting. Not aerial weakness but unintelligent use of our aerial strength has been responsible for the Allied disasters in Africa. The solution is being found in an improvement in tactics.

We know less about the air fighting in the Soviet Union. Both sides have used planes as support for their armies rather than as an independent striking force. Neither air force has at any time seriously threatened the destruction of the other, though the surprise and impact of the original German attack handicapped Soviet planes during the first few months of the war. Most of the time the Luftwaffe has been somewhat superior in numbers. Because air operations here and in Libya are usually conducted at low altitudes, some of our older fighter planes have done better on these fronts than elsewhere. The good quality of most types of Soviet planes has refuted the statements of such airmen as Major Al Williams, who before the war dismissed them as valueless misfits. The real surprise, however, has been the success of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in maneuvering under the nose of German air power.

In Western Europe too much was expected of both the R. A. F. and the U. S. Army Air Corps after the June raid on Cologne. There followed loose talk about thousand-plane raids every night and even wilder predictions of raids of five thousand planes a night. Since the replacement and maintenance problems of 1,000-plane raids are almost prohibitive, these expectations were not fulfilled. Only on two occasions, over Emden and Bremen, were the airmen able to repeat; bombing expeditions of from five hundred to a thousand planes have occurred only half a dozen times. Although centers as far distant as Genoa and Danzig have not been forgotten, attacks have been concentrated on northern France and western Germany. That they have achieved great destruction of material and impairment of morale is revealed by the industries that have been moved elsewhere and the as yet unfulfilled promises of help from both Göring and Goebbels. The summer and fall raids frequently dropped many times the quantity of explosives that fell on Coventry. German retaliation has been weak and intermittent.

The air offensive will increase in scope and effectiveness in the coming months as more American bombers become available for daylight raids and as the longer nights lengthen the range of British night bombers. At the same time, the fact that the Germans have not recalled their air force from Russia proves that Allied air activity is not yet considered a serious threat to German victory. Another disappointing feature of the air war in Europe was the unfortunate failure at Dieppe, in spite of Allied air dominance and close coordination between planes and landing forces.

In the southwestern Pacific, now an active area, the United States has clear-cut qualitative superiority in air power and possibly superior numbers as well. Here airplanes operate both independently and in conjunction with sea and land forces. While the inability of planes alone to prevent Japanese reinforcements and supplies from being landed on Guadalcanal is disappointing, the general record is good. Had sea and land units been managed recently with equal skill, the United Nations would undoubtedly be in a better situation.

At Kiska the Japanese seem destined to take an unmerciful pounding, since nearby American air bases now give us all the advantages. Unless a Siberian campaign is opened, this foothold has lost for the enemy the very slight strategic value it once possessed.

Meanwhile, aerial reinforcements have aided both India and China. In conjunction with the terrain obstacles, the reinforcement of British naval units, and the large Indian army, they have made an immediate Japanese attack on India unlikely. In China they have improved morale and aided the Chinese armies. The limiting factor on their effectiveness has been the difficulty of transportation and supply—especially the supply of gasoline. In evacuating airfields within bombing range of their homeland the Japanese probably knew that these fields could not immediately become bases for Flying Fortresses.

If there is one lesson which the war has emphasized more strongly than any other it is the need for cooperation. Victory is the reward of teamwork, not of brilliant solo performance. A command which has kept our air forces unified with the army and navy has made mistakes but has spared us many of the jealousies and squabbles which have hindered the teamwork of the two services.

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BOOKS and the ARTS

MERRY-GO-ROUND

BY CONSTANCE CARRIER

Out of the sterile eye he sees, or does not see,
the live ones galloping by in angular grace,
their manes and their tails blown back by the wind like
banners,
their hoofbeats heavily hollow against the ground.

And now the music begins: the machinery starts,
and the wooden horse moves with it, his lifted forefoot
ignorant always of motion, of the feel of the ground,
the flare of his nostril a travesty on breath.

But he gains momentum, and the moving air
slides over his painted body as over live hide:
he is carried around the core of the music—around
and around and faster and faster till surely
he has come into freedom at last, for almost the hoof
paws at the air, almost the carved mane breaks
the pattern to which hand shaped it, almost he leaps
to run with the others across the measureless meadow.

But the music stops, and the ancient crazy engine
slows to a grinding halt, and the moment is over,
and the others, the living ones, gone, and he only left
tethered,
staring inscrutably, fiercely, speared on a rod,
his mane blown back by no wind, his forefoot lifted.

Brown Among the Brass Hats

SUEZ TO SINGAPORE. By Cecil Brown. Random House. $3.50.

EXPELLED from Rome, arrested as a spy by the Nazi invaders of Yugoslavia, Cecil Brown reached the Palestine border in high hopes. "Here there were men who wanted to kill Axis soldiers with the same lust to kill that I felt. . . . This was escape, mental and physical, from the Axis."

This honeymoon mood quickly changed to disillusion. Brown got on happily enough with the fighting British, for whose steadfast courage he again and again expresses the utmost admiration, but he was soon at loggerheads with the officials and brass hats. Everywhere he found himself tripping over red tape and banging his head against a blank wall of censorship. Buzzing like an angry bee and stinging every hand that refused to feed him information, or snatched from him the news he had gathered for himself, he tried in vain to make the British authorities see that their cause would be strengthened by giving America unvarnished reporting instead of bed-time stories.

All Mr. Brown's colleagues—including those British correspondents now struggling with censorship in Washington—will sympathize with his tribulations and applaud his valiant fight. But, it must be admitted, his valor often got the better of his discretion; somewhat suaver methods might have proved more effective in achieving the commendable task he had set himself. Stupid as many of the censors were, they were not always at fault, and some of them may be forgiven for resenting the brashness of a correspondent who, on occasion, seemed to take the attitude that the war was being fought chiefly for its news value and ought to be regulated to conform with American deadlines.

It must be admitted, too, that Brown was given to editorializing in a way which would have made a good copy-desk man, as well as a censor, reach for his blue pencil. For instance, on December 3, 1941, Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, commander-in-chief of the British forces in the Far East, gave a general off-the-record press interview on the subject of probable Japanese moves. He said, in effect, that while Japan might go off the rails, the indications were that it would not attack Britain or America at that time. Brown accurately scribbled on his note-pad: "They think it ain't going to happen"; but when he wrote the story of the interview, he began: "Informed quarters whose reliability unquestioned asserted Japan now virtually certain to engage in military operations and direction will be southward." The censor sent it back reading: "Informed quarters asserted Japan not certain engaging in military operations," which was a much more accurate summary of Brooke-Popham's talk. Brown, however, complains: "That, of course, changed the whole sense. My effort was to try to convey to the American people that war was coming out here. . . . The British still believed that war was not coming." Clearly Brown was a better prognosticator than Brooke-Popham, but as a reporter it was not his job to substitute his own views for those of the authority from whom his story had been derived.

In spite of such lapses, Cecil Brown is normally a good and careful reporter. His greatest story, brilliantly retold in this book, is of course the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, a tragedy of which he was an eyewitness and nearly a victim. But apart from a few such set-pieces, the chief interest and value of the book are in its running account of the decline and fall of Singapore. And a grim tale of muddle, mismanagement, and complacency it is. Brown quotes Edgar Mowrer as saying that the legend of Singapore's "impregnability was the greatest hoax ever played on the American public." The truth seems to be that the British authorities, unwilling or unable to divert troops and materials on a really adequate scale to Malaya, built up the legend in the naive belief that they could scare off the Japanese. Instead of bluffing Tokyo—whose spy system functioned with unimpeded efficiency—they succeeded in persuading themselves that nothing would happen. Even the first Japanese raid didn't wake them up. They still relied on the "impassable jungles" of the Malay Peninsula to stop the enemy.

"Suez to Singapore" would be a better book if it were shorter. There are too many personal details, too many

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round-by-round accounts of fights with censors, each one depressingly similar to the last. In his broadcast talks Mr. Brown is forced to be terse; he may be allotted exactly three and a half minutes to describe a whole campaign. He can, therefore, be forgiven for seeking relaxation in a literary sprawl between covers. But his publishers would have been doing both him and his readers a service if they had cut this self-indulgence short. KEITH HUTCHISON

Four Decades of American Prose

ON NATIVE GROUNDS. By Alfred Kazin. Reynal and Hitchcock. $3.75.

ALFRED KAZIN'S study of the American prose literature of this century is an admirable book. Good in itself, it seems even better when compared with two works of smaller but similar intention, Bernard Smith's passionately dull "Forces in American Criticism" and Maxwell Geismar's dully passionate "Writers in Crisis." Mr. Kazin has no political partisanship to defend, no simple moralism to recommend. He writes with spirit, though an essentially good manner is too often spoiled by too much of itself; his scholarship is notable for range and painstakingness; his taste is mature and discriminating.

It is a good book and a saddening book. Some of its saddening quality is, I feel, unnecessary, but most of it is inescapable. Mr. Kazin believes, and he is right, that the common estimate of our literature has been too lenient, that we still judge our recent literary past with the pleased surprise that we have any books at all. And when it is judged, as Mr. Kazin judges it, by standards more than local, our literature of the last forty years seems far from adequate—seems, indeed, almost to have failed.

In saying this, Mr. Kazin says what is now in many people's minds. Now, in a period of literary pause, when literature seems to be waiting for events to resolve themselves, we naturally turn back to what we have so long considered the periods of fertility; we look for something in the not-so-distant past to fill the present gap, and we find very little. Sydney Smith's famous question was answered long ago: everybody reads an American book. The new question is, "Who *rereads* an American book?" To be sure, our classic literature of the nineteenth century still stands, but how easily the great names of twenty, fifteen, ten years back have become merely historical and symbolic. They are the names of the men who helped educate us, but can we read them now with the pleasure which, in literature, is profit?

Even when we take into account the natural impulse to overvalue what is contemporary and even if we take for granted that, in any period, the greater number of interesting writers must soon sink out of sight, we cannot help feeling that the proportion of the demoded and the impossible to read is too high. As Scott Fitzgerald said, there are no second acts in American lives, let alone third acts—not in American literary lives. We seldom see a writer grow in power, develop and go on to new things. The typical fate of the American writer is to burst forth with the perception of a moment, impress it on us, exhaust his own vision, and die.

Such, I think, is the saddening fact. It is hard, perhaps impossible, to explain. Mr. Kazin gives a good deal of weight to the rapidity with which American political and social situations change. By the time a writer has encompassed a particular situation it has passed, without giving him a chance to grow into it: to the writer, American life is a series of challenges from an antagonist who steps out of the fight and leaves his opponent flailing the air. And the pressure of rapid change has a provincializing effect, for the American writer becomes so preoccupied with the present and the local that he maintains no adequate relation with the past and the general, with the tradition of Europe or of his own America. Of this Anderson and Dreiser are examples. Then there is the public demand that every book be an event, so that no writer can easily conceive his career as a development; Sinclair Lewis exemplifies the effect of this demand. None of these, of course, is a sufficient explanation; the sad fact remains unexplained.

Yet perhaps Mr. Kazin makes the fact even sadder than it really is. His appreciation of achievement is both delicate and generous, yet he too much inclines to rest his judgments on the inadequacies rather than the accomplishments of a writer's work. Thus, to take a notable example, in dealing with John Dewey, Mr. Kazin ends with Dewey's lack of the tragic sense of life and supports his judgment with a quotation from Yeats. Perhaps this is a pertinent objection to make to Dewey (though it would be better as a comment on him), and I will not dispute it except to say that Dewey is not Yeats and that Yeats does not have the manipulative sense of life; but I think it is not an objection that qualifies, to the extent Mr. Kazin suggests, the monumental work Dewey achieved. So with Edmund Wilson: Mr. Kazin has a just appreciation of both Wilson's powers and limitations; yet he would have been even juster if he had begun with Wilson's limitations and ended with his powers, rather than the other way around.

There is, indeed, a saddening amount of individual failure in our literature, but there is also a heartening amount of general success. The individual figures shrink under close examination, any number of them did not fulfil the promise of their talents: but I cannot help feeling that the general achievement is large. And clearly Mr. Kazin thinks so too —the belief is implicit in the very tone of his book; the very assumptions by which he judges failure could have been made only in a culture that had developed successfully.

I am sorry that the plan of Mr. Kazin's book forced him to exclude the poets. They would have made the picture both more cheerful and more instructive. Not that all our poets are exempt from the judgment of inadequacy. But many of our poets, preoccupied as they are with form, hopeless of appealing to popular taste and of seeming to solve immediate situations, have been able to cultivate the inwardness and growth whose lack in the prose writers Mr. Kazin so often and so rightly deplores. When we have said all the hard things about the obscurity by which they have alienated popular taste, we must see that they, far more than the novelists and critics, have given us that rightness of tone which—we too often forget—is all-important in literature. The very saddest thing we can say of contemporary literature is that so few men's voices ring in our ears as trustworthy

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and lovable. I think all of us are beginning to be conscious of sharing Pascal's feeling that what we want is not the "writer" but the "honest man"—remembering of course that the voice of the honest man depends on the honesty of his art. What we have all become so dissatisfied with in our prose writers is exactly the tones of their voices—Anderson's quasi-religious cheerful whine, Wolfe's velvety self-love, Dreiser's sourness, Hemingway's brag, Faulkner's rant. And among the poets there are voices—Frost's, Cummings's, Stevens's, Van Doren's, Louise Bogan's, Ransom's—that can sound right and true.

And this suggests the ground of my disagreement with Mr. Kazin when he attacks the formal critics—Ransom, Tate, Blackmur, Cleanth Brooks—putting them at the opposite pole of critical extravagance from the Marxists. With the political assumptions of these critics, when they have them, I do not agree. With much of their method I have elsewhere expressed disagreement. But these critics with their precise, sometimes too precise, study of poetry have helped remind us what poetry is.

Other readers of Mr. Kazin's book will find other matters about which they will want to argue with him, and their disagreement will be, as mine is, the measure of the respect his book commands. Conceived on a grand scale and as not only a literary but a moral history, it is quite the best and most complete treatment we have of an arduous and difficult subject.

LIONEL TRILLING

Progressive Unionism

THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY. By Clinton S. Golden and Harold J. Ruttenberg. Harper and Brothers. $3.

LABOR practice and theory are coming of age. No longer forced to wage mere guerrilla warfare for recognition, organized labor is broadening the tactical approach to its interests to fit them into the interests of other useful functional groups in the community. The Golden-Ruttenberg book is an important expression of the new unionism.

The book comes out of the experience of the Steel Workers' Organizing Committee, now the Steel Workers' Union, in the years 1937 to 1941, as distilled through the understanding and imagination of a regional director and the research director of the union. Workers come alive in this book, animated by their needs and the needs of the community in which they work and live as workers and citizens. You will not find in these pages either the distortions of the limited old-style unionism or the distortions of "radical" doctrinaires who want to make labor the object of their struggle for totalitarian power. The book is fresh, clear-headed, realistic, yet unyieldingly faithful to labor's interests. It propounds thirty-seven "principles" of union-management relations; most of them are basic, only a few are incidental or dubious. The revealing discussion of many problems—the human as well as economic motives that impel workers to join unions, qualified property right in the job, the workers' quest for security, the case for the union, not the closed, shop, the need for industry-wide collective bargaining—is knit together by understanding of the attitudes of both workers and management and by a broad grasp of economic tendencies and realities.

Case after case might be cited to prove the book's clear-headed, realistic, fresh approach. One of them is the need for wage equalization because of what the new technology is doing to old wage structures. Under the new technology, which is largely automatic, efficiency depends almost wholly on the mechanical equipment, not on the workers. Hence the value of incentive wage systems becomes nil. Moreover, wage rates based on the workers' muscle and skill are no longer an index of performance. Yet in the new continuous-strip steel mills, for example, sheet-metal workers—upon whom output used to depend, whereas it now depends on the equipment—are still paid a specific tonnage rate; this brings about unjust conditions, with one group of workers overpaid and other groups underpaid. It is one of the "most explosive" problems in union-management relations; the Steel Workers' Union is experimentally yet courageously tackling it in a move for equalization of wages.

Golden and Ruttenberg use the term "industrial democracy" in a narrower yet truer sense than the doctrinaire "radicals," to designate a constitutional democratic set-up in industry, where labor and its free unions have definite rights and powers in relation to management and government. It is not the metaphysical "industrial democracy" of communism, which ends in bureaucratic totalitarian mastery over the workers. The Golden-Ruttenberg conception of industrial democracy—democratic relations and inalienable rights in the places where people must work to live—fits into any form of economic organization, from private enterprise to public enterprise and cooperatives.

The Golden-Ruttenberg conception of union-management cooperation is much broader and more progressive than the one that prevailed in the 1920's. The older conception was largely an expression of union weakness; the new is an expression of union strength. While the new conception emphasizes the increased productive efficiency—cases are cited in which cooperation brought efficiency gains ranging from 20 per cent to more than 50 per cent—union-management cooperation as practiced by the Steel Workers' Union is an integral part of collective bargaining and proceeds under definite contractual relations, with machinery for research and planning composed of an equal number of union and management representatives; *no worker loses his job from the greater efficiency that comes of union suggestions.* Moreover, cooperation becomes the foundation of a constitutional order in industry where—in the words of the president of a steel company quoted by the authors—"the union and plant management are a kind of natural check and balance on one another."

The book closes with a plea for more governmental economic activity and planning to bring full production, which cannot be brought by collective bargaining and union-management cooperation. This is the least satisfactory part of the book since its argument is limited almost exclusively to the "industry council" idea, for which too much is claimed. More exciting and significant is the fact that the authors see what so many liberal intellectuals do not see—the danger of statism, the need to confine the state's new powers to those spheres where they are indispensable while

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allowing the largest measure of self-government to all useful functional groups in the community.

> In a free society [they write] private groups can fail to settle their problems in direct relationships only at the peril of their independent existence, because each unsettled social and economic problem eventually finds its way into the halls of Congress. And when the government assumes final responsibility for the solution of these problems, private groups must forfeit certain freedoms and powers. Government action in the field of social and economic matters should be in the form of assisting private groups in our economy toward a solution. . . . The future of free America might well hinge on the extent to which industry will go in cooperation with organized labor, and government will go in encouraging it.
>
> LEWIS COREY

The Carrier Lex

QUEEN OF THE FLAT-TOPS. By Stanley Johnston. E. P. Dutton and Company. $3.

IT WAS a new kind of war to which Stanley Johnston sailed when the aircraft carrier Lexington set out from Hawaii one morning last spring for the South Seas. The experience was almost as new to the navy as it was to the lone newspaper reporter aboard. The Lex, as navy men called her, was twenty years old, but they had been peace years, and her wars had been fought on blackboards.

On this cruise she was put to the test, and so was her brand of warfare. She became the first American carrier to engage an enemy carrier in battle, and she sank it. She played the starring role in the war's first major naval engagement, the Battle of the Coral Sea, which was so predominantly aerial that the contending surface ships never came within gunshot of each other; the carriers and their planes decided the issue. She made history, and she went to the bottom in flames.

Mr. Johnston saw it all. His recounting of it is not too smoothly woven together; for the most part it is unadorned, and better so. He does not belong to the introspective school of war correspondents. His hero is the Lex, not himself, and he does not mention the fact that her commander asked the navy to cite him for heroism for having dragged seared men from the fires inside her in her dying hours. Later he and his paper, the Chicago *Tribune,* were under fire from the Navy Department because his background analysis of the Battle of Midway was supposed to have given away secrets. A grand jury cleared them. No one who reads this book could believe that Mr. Johnston would knowingly write a single word injurious to the navy.

If anything, he is over-enthusiastic. He likens the Lexington's battles to the conflict between the Monitor and Merrimac as a turning-point in naval warfare. To him the aircraft carrier is supreme, despite the loss of the Lex, and his book makes a convincing case. The battleship simply is not in the picture. Whether land-based planes will outmode the carrier, as Major de Seversky maintains, is a question at present irrelevant in these vast ocean areas of the Pacific; no land planes with sufficient range are available.

The value of Mr. Johnston's book lies in his fascinating

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details about the new warfare he watched. When dive-bombers attacked an enemy aircraft carrier, they started at 16,000 feet and followed each other down in the same track, "like salmon flashing over an immense waterfall." Scout planes two hundred miles at sea identified themselves by girls' names in reporting back to the Lex by radio: "Jean to carrier. Concentration enemy shipping Tulagi." A pilot in the clouds above the Lex reported a Japanese four-motored seaplane, and the carrier asked where it was. "Wait a minute and I'll show him to you," replied the pilot; sure enough, a minute or two later a large ball of fire spun to the water in the midst of the fleet. In the last hours of the Lex, when the ammunition was about to blow up, the men waiting to be rescued calmly ate up the ship's ice cream.

Mr. Johnston's book offers something no other correspondent has been able to write—a tale of war pioneers in action.

MARCUS DUFFIELD

To God via Semantics

PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY: A STUDY IN THE SYMBOLISM OF REASON, RITE, AND ART. By Susanne K. Langer. Harvard University Press. $3.50.

PATHS OF LIFE: PREFACE TO A WORLD RELIGION. By Charles Morris. Harper and Brothers. $3.

THESE two books testify to a rather startling development, which has its tinge of irony. Hitherto theory of signs, or "semantics," has been chiefly associated—and especially in its popular manifestations—with debunking. The debunking has usually been directed against metaphysics, art, ethics, and religion in behalf of the scientific attitude. With Dr. Langer and Professor Morris, however, a more thorough philosophical exploration of semiotics—as the study is called by philosophers—has led to the conviction that science is not enough, that the symbols of art and religion have their indispensable value. Neither of the two philosophers in question, indeed, has been primarily a debunker. But both have acquired their reputations principally as students of the scientific uses of language. Mrs. Langer, of Radcliffe, has written an excellent "Introduction to Symbolic Logic," and Professor Morris, of Chicago, is an editor of the "International Encyclopedia of Unified Science" and the author of "Foundations of the Theory of Signs," a synthesis of those scientifically minded doctrines, positivism and pragmatism.

Mrs. Langer declares that for our age the key to both scientific and humanistic problems is the study of "symbolic transformation." This study is considerably more inclusive than what has been popularized as "semantics," and wider even than philosophy of language. In "Philosophy in a New Key," Mrs. Langer attempts to treat the scientific of ritual, myth, and art. To this end she draws upon the findings of psychoanalysis, anthropology, and aesthetic criticism as well as upon those sciences which have previously been the focus of semiotics.

What is distinctive about her philosophical approach is that it is, to put it technically, naturalistic without being reductive. The study of artistic and religious symbolism has for the most part been carried on by idealists who have been more concerned with establishing a transcendental source for mind than with analyzing its operations. When empirical and naturalistic thinkers, on the other hand, tackle these problems, they usually employ a heavy hand. They force the non-scientific uses of symbols into the scientific categories; or they dismiss them as "emotive"; or they "explain" them by means of such crude concepts as glandular functioning or conditioned reflexes. Mrs. Langer starts from the principle that man has characteristically human needs, and the chief of these is the need of symbolization. Man is the talking animal, the symbol-making animal. Other creatures use signs, but only man has the developed capacity to use symbols. Signs are proxies for objects, events, or situations—indications of their existence, past, present, or future; they are merely instrumental to action. Symbols, on the other hand, are both instruments and ends. Their primary function is representative, and they represent conceptions as well as objects. Man has a compulsive need to transform his experience into symbols, so that symbolization is an activity pursued in part for its own sake.

Mrs. Langer accepts the highly speculative theory of the "festal" origin of language, according to which speech becomes fixed in the rituals generated in the play-excitement following successful communal enterprise. Expressions whose meanings are thus established are applied to similar feelings and perceptions outside the festive situation, and speech develops by the dual processes of "emendation" and "metaphor."

Ritual and myth, then, are the twin sources of symbolism. Ritual begins in motor tendencies, and has as its chief function the articulation of emotional and practical attitudes toward the world. Myth begins in dream-fantasy, and develops through the folk tale, heroic legend, and epic into a coherent picture of social and cosmic forces, imaginatively represented.

From here on, symbolism branches out in two divergent directions. One is toward the logical and scientific functions of speech, which create language. The chief characteristics of language are a vocabulary of elements with fixed meanings, definite rules of syntax, and the logical implications that flow from these. The other direction of symbolism is toward artistic expression. Music, the art which receives most of the author's attention, is not, properly speaking, a language, for its notes do not constitute a vocabulary, since they do not have in isolation definite meanings which are retained when they are combined. Yet music is not mere self-expression; it has a semantic function. It represents and communicates "emotions, moods, mental tensions, and resolutions"; it gives a "logical picture of sentient, responsive life"; it is "a source of insight, not a plea for sympathy." It is suggested that the characteristic function of art in general is to give us a similar "knowledge by acquaintance" of our affective life.

The book concludes with a plea that our ethical and social thinking should take into account the universal human need for imaginative as well as logical symbolism. Man "can adapt himself somehow to anything that his imagination can cope with, but he cannot deal with chaos." Since logical symbolism does not suffice to organize our emotional and ethical attitudes, we need also the "charged" symbols with

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multiple meanings which have been supplied in the past by art and religion. "A life that does not incorporate some degree of ritual, of gesture and attitude, has no mental anchorage. It is prosaic to the point of total indifference, purely casual, devoid of that structure of intellect and feeling which we call 'personality.'"

In "Paths of Life," Charles Morris is less concerned with the general theory of symbolism than with establishing a set of concrete symbols which can help us to understand and direct our lives in a chaotic age. The conflicts of our time have emphasized the need for a "basic orientation of the total personality," and this, he declares, is the religious need. Yet no one of the existing traditions can now fill this need.

The first task, he holds, is to find a scheme for classifying the principal components of human personality. The components he singles out are the "Dionysian," "Promethean," and "Buddhistic," which consist respectively of the emotionally expansive tendencies, the active or manipulating tendencies, and the tendencies leading to self-restraint. Combined in various proportions, these give rise to six personality types, which he classifies as the Buddhist, Dionysian, Promethean, Christian, Apollonian, and Mohammedan. Arts, doctrines, and cultures take their form from the personality types which prevail in them.

Each of the six, however, Morris says, neglects some important aspects of human nature. So he proposes for our allegiance a new ideal of personality which he calls, after the future Enlightened One prophesied by Gautama Buddha, the Maitreyan. This is the completely balanced man, who will hold the Dionysian, Promethean, and Buddhistic components in equal proportion. Maitreyan man's goal is "detached attachment"; this consists in a critical humanism which seeks to absorb the partial insights of other points of view without falling into an amorphous eclecticism. Morris conceives Maitreyanism as not merely an ethics but a religion, and in an appendix he contributes some free-verse psalms to its liturgy.

Such attempts to *will* a religion have their sanguine side, and it is easy to laugh at them. Certain objections will readily occur: that religions in the past have not been created by fiat but by a slow and secular growth, that similar efforts, from the French Revolution's worship of the goddess of Reason, through Auguste Comte's Religion of Humanity, to the humanistic cult of the Reverend Mr. Potter of Chicago, have failed to win popular allegiance. A difficulty with the first two of these, at least, was that they attempted to cut a religion out of whole cloth. Professor Morris seems to be aware of the problem, since he says that in America we have our Christian and Promethean traditions to build on. A still further problem is the absence today of a rich popular store of myth, legend, and folk art such as frequently has blossomed into high religion. But our civilization is self-conscious as no previous one, and it is unlikely that a worthy new religious movement, if possible at all, would "just grow." The need which Mrs. Langer and Professor Morris are concerned with is such a tragically evident one that we should give ear to our prophets, however strange and uncouth may be the mantles they wear.

PHILIP BLAIR RICE

pour la VICTOIRE
JOURNAL FRANÇAIS AMERIQUE

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The Sorcerer as Elegist

PARTS OF A WORLD. By Wallace Stevens. Knopf. $2.

THE toucan is an enchanting bird. He is perky and pensive by turns. His round eye flashes as he eats, but when he has swallowed, the long beak bends slowly down, now to one side, now to the other, and the head is the head of a skeptic. Wallace Stevens, who often writes of toucans, is the most entrancing of them. But now he seems to have swallowed his magical world for good, and to watch him sadly contemplate the darkening scene is to wish, sometimes, that he were an eagle.

For it takes an eagle, preferably a Yeats eagle, to be at ease on the heights to which Stevens here aspires. Of course, he may become one: his growth has been steadily manifest these past twenty years. In "Harmonium" he created an enchanted country, uniquely rounded, wholly credible. It has its pathos, but chiefly that of individual yearning for a more perfect imagined universe: the "idea of a colony" in "The Comedian as the Letter C," the "paradise" of "Sunday Morning." In the two subsequent collections, "Ideas of Order" and "The Man with the Blue Guitar," the conflict of such longings with the increasingly cruel outer world is dramatized, and the poet's power grows with his theme. Once it was Crispin, the aesthete "comedian," "green crammer of the green fruits of the world," who sought a "mythology of self." Now it is "all people," those who "cry and cry for help," that must find again "the warm antiquity of self." And when the search leads to defeat and despair, Stevens approaches the tragic, as in The Men That Are Falling, which I consider his most intensely moving poem. But the present collection reveals that he has been experimenting with that perilous thing, the poet's answer to his own predicament.

Our time makes such answers peculiarly hard, because the predicament is largely imposed by the very formation of a poetic personality, a creative ambience. Colossal effort of will is needed in order to dwell for the needed time "where," as Henry James phrased it, "in the dim underworld of fiction, the great glazed tank of art, strange silent subjects float." And this effort necessitates a severance from the actual. How is the artist to "return," to set his art right with the world, if to do so he must employ the only creative processes he knows, those which established his unique world, his true mythical self?

As with Yeats, Stevens's attempt involves some rejection of former aims. Yeats "banished heroic mother moon and vanished, came to look upon the timid sun"; and Stevens cries, in Montrachet-le-Jardin, the most successful of these poems: "Bastard châteaux and smoky demoiselles,/No more. I can build towers of my own,/There to behold, there to proclaim, the grace/And free requiting of the responsive fact,/To project the naked man in a state of fact,/As acutest virtue and ascetic trove." But he doesn't build the towers; he chiefly proclaims that he can. In the series entitled Examination of the Hero in a Time of War he does make an impressive effort at construction, developing—by his accustomed devious routes, but with fewer green vistas than before—a concept of the hero as a redeeming, radiant force inherent in humanity: neither the superior "Leader" nor the uncreative "common man," but "Instead of allegory,/We have and are the man, capable/Of his brave quickenings, the human/Accelerations that seem inhuman." It is good doctrine, strongly and often beautifully stated, but not with the light and music, pensive and perky by turns, that made his other world so livable. These are more evident in the shorter, more personal poems, many of which are extremely lovely, notably On the Road Home and The Hand as a Being, utterances of a contemplative yet quickening love of the sensible world.

Stevens himself, as one would expect from so sure a critic of his work, seems disquieted by this development. He finds it necessary to append a comment stating that in war time "consciousness takes the place of the imagination." I assume that by "consciousness" he means "intelligence," but the choice of words is revealing. As the "unconscious" imagined world fades, the force that created it is supplanted by the endeavor to *understand* the total world—or so Stevens feels. But this feeling indicates that his is not the invincible imagination of the supreme poet, an imagination that always feeds, peace or war, week day or holiday, on precisely that "consciousness," in Stevens's sense of the word. Why, as it increases, does a Yeats grow greater, a Stevens become unsure? For one thing: toucan or eagle, Stevens's imagination matured in a willed detachment, Yeats's in a willed togetherness with the past and present of his nation. Such factors may have nothing to do with the difference between talent and genius, but they certainly affect the capacity of self-renewal.

FRANK JONES

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IN BRIEF

THE STATUS SYSTEM OF A MODERN COMMUNITY. By W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt. Volume II, Yankee City Series. Yale University Press. $3.

This is the second of six volumes in the most elaborate study of an American city ever made. The study is important, and this volume deals with a fresh and badly underworked aspect of American life. But the authors bury their readers under an avalanche of matter-of-fact summaries of statistical tables and charts. It is regrettable that such a magnificent study has been put together by the mechanical routine of the assembly-line. Professor Warner and his staff here analyze how the 17,000 people in a New England city, classified in six social classes (from upper upper to lower lower), group themselves into associations, cliques, economic, political, religious, and other structures. This has never been done before, and it is an important thing to do, particularly at this time when we Americans confront the urgent necessity of discovering how to weld our society together more securely and effectively. But the point in studying static structure is to get on beyond it to the understanding of dynamic interaction. And the authors largely let things stand as structure. The treatment of the phenomenon of "social class" is typical. The authors dislike "class" as the nasty controversial concept Karl Marx talked about; so they attempt to get down beneath the solid fact of "class" as an economic phenomenon to its allegedly more real essence in "social status." This procedure succeeds so well that it largely blunts the cutting edge of "class" as a dynamic analytical concept for dealing with the life of an industrial city.

UNTIL THAT DAY. By Kressmann Taylor. An Eagle Book, Distributed by Duell, Sloan, and Pearce. $2.75.

The author of "Address Unknown" does a quiet, circumstantial but inevitably dramatic account of the Lutheran Church's fight against Nazism. Karl Hoffman, the son of a pastor in Magdeburg, was a student at the time of Hitler's coming to power; he joined his father in maintaining God against the swastika—a heroic battle and an uneven one in which the father is killed and the son is in constant danger until his final escape to America. A book to prove that at least some part of the church can and will fight when once it recognizes fascism's threat to its existence.

FAIR IS OUR LAND. Edited by Samuel Chamberlain. Introduction by Donald Moffat. Hastings House. $5.

A fine collection of strong, clean, and unpretentious photographs, weakened by the inclusion of a few insipid etchings. There are no contributions from the "Tobacco Road" school of photography, but an abundance of technically superb images of often fabulously beautiful landscapes. By way of foreword Mr. Moffat has deliberately written something so "fine" that even this hardened reader of picture-book prefaces still does not believe it to be possible.

THE PORT OF NEW ORLEANS. By Harold Sinclair. Doubleday, Doran and Company. $3.50.

New Orleans, by all odds the most romantic American seaport, receives the least romantic treatment of any so far covered in the Seaport Series. As there is no dearth of romantic books on the subject, which possesses enough fascination to stand the most straightforward account, this is not in itself a drawback. The political and social history of New Orleans, however, is subdued to a mere adjunct of its economic rise and fall as the gateway to the Mississippi Valley, and its atmosphere and charm are dealt with in a rather grudging final chapter tacked on as compensation. The author's whole attitude is sharp and hard-boiled, doubtless in reaction to the lush travel writers. One is glad to have his plain facts but wishes for greater sympathy and proportion in their presentation. It is also a pity that he has not refrained from topical reflections more suited to newspaper correspondence, which will date the book almost immediately. Few subjects lend themselves better to illustration; but the pictures included are few, random, and not particularly interesting.

WHAT'S IN A NOVEL. By Helen E. Haines. Columbia University Press. $2.75.

The object of the book is to survey the content of the novel rather than to discuss styles or evaluate achievements in purely literary terms. Nevertheless, judgments are often made, upon the basis of a somewhat undiscriminating appetite. Several useful chapters deal with the European and South American novel as it has been translated into English. Miss Haines's volume might serve fairly well as a reader's guide, though the effects of her chapter on Reviewing a Novel might well be disastrous to one aiming to develop his critical insight.

RECENTLY PUBLISHED

Aishah, the Beloved of Mohammed. By Nabia Abbott. Chicago. $2.50.

When Doctors Are Rationed. By Dwight Anderson and Margaret Baylous. Coward-McCann. $2.

The St. Lawrence. By Henry Beston. Farrar and Rinehart. $2.50.

Primer for Combat. By Kay Boyle. Simon and Schuster. $2.50.

The War in Maps: An Atlas of the New York "Times" Maps. Text by Francis Brown. Maps by Emil Herlin. Oxford. $1.50.

Lower Mississippi. By Hodding Carter. Farrar and Rinehart. $2.50.

The Hormones in Human Reproduction. By George W. Corner. Princeton. $2.75.

Time to Enquire: How Can We Restore the Freedom, Opportunity, and Dignity of the Average Man? By Samuel Crowther. John Day. $2.75.

Flush Production: The Epic of Oil in the Gulf-Southwest. By Gerald Forbes. Oklahoma. $2.75.

Memories of Happy Days. By Julian Green. Harper. $3.

Safe Deliverance. By Frederick C. Irving, M. D. Houghton Mifflin. $3.

How to Be Fit. By Robert Kiphuth. Yale. $2.

The Starlit Dome: Studies in the Poetry of Vision. By G. Wilson Knight. Oxford. $4.50.

On Borrowed Peace. By Prince Hubertus zu Loewenstein. Doubleday, Doran. $3.

The Last Man Comes Home. American Travel Journals, 1941-1942, of Stephen Longstreet. Random House. $3.

Men and Ideas: An Informal History of Chinese Political Thought. By Lin Mousheng. John Day. $2.50.

Plays for Americans: Thirteen New Non-Royalty Radio Plays. By Arch Oboler. Farrar and Rinehart. $2.50.

Willard Gibbs. By Muriel Rukeyser. Doubleday, Doran. $3.50.

Dogsled Apostles. By A. H. Savage. Sheed and Ward. $2.75.

The Theory of Capitalist Development. By Paul M. Sweezy. Oxford. $4.

Francis Parkman: Heroic Historian. By Mason Wade. Viking. $4.50.

Dust Tracks on a Road: An Autobiography. By Zora Neale Hurston. Lippincott. $3.

German Philosophy and Politics. By John Dewey. Putnam's. $2.

German Psychological Warfare. Edited by Ladislas Farago. Putnam's. $3.

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This Is America. By Eleanor Roosevelt and Frances Cooke Macgregor. Putnam's. $3.

America and the Axis War. By Denys Smith. Macmillan. $3.

I Came Out of the Eighteenth Century. By John A. Rice. Harper. $3.

MUSIC

"THIS man, is he a musician—or is he a musicologist?" was the way one great musician expressed his opinion not only of a statement in a book, and of the man who had written it, but incidentally of what musicologists feel and think and find to say about music. The musicologists' own opinion of the value of their activities was expressed in Dr. Lang's statement in the *American Scholar*—that the public would get the guidance it needed when newspapers opened their columns to the scholars. They do not contend merely that their investigations into matters like "Dissonance in Early Polyphony up to Tinctoris" establish valuable facts in the history of musical language and style, or that their investigations into the relation of a musical style to the other human activities of its period establishes valuable facts in the history of culture; they contend instead that knowledge of such facts is indispensable for the complete experience and correct understanding of music as music. When they insist on our being aware of the relation between a piece of music and the other activities of its period it is not merely to give us correct notions about history: we are, as I understand it, to take Mozart's G minor or Beethoven's Op. 130 as a communication of the conditions, forces, tendencies of its period. Certainly it is possible to discover in a Cézanne still-life relations of its elements to what operated on Cézanne as he painted it—not only the work of other painters and their ideas about painting, but the general ideas and attitudes, the social and political conditions of his time. But it is possible also for a person with no notion of these relations to take the still-life for what it is and what it was intended to be—something exercising power on mind and emotions as an arrangement of pictorial elements. And so with one of Mozart's symphonies or Beethoven's last quartets.

Addressing a meeting of his fellows, Dr. Curt Sachs pointed out how they served music: "To music, elapsing in time and fading into oblivion, we give memory, permanence, and the dignity that history alone can yield." I have myself commented from time to time on the fact that while certain important works are played over and over again others are left unperformed; I have made this point about concertos of Mozart, sonatas, symphonies, quartets of Haydn, Berlioz's "Romeo and Juliet," "Childhood of Christ," "Trojans." But it is not such music that the musicologists serve. True, we are indebted to Dr. Alfred Einstein for the experience of those superb Haydn symphonies which the New Friends of Music let us hear for the first time: it was he who reconstructed the scores from various manuscripts of the parts. But Dr. Einstein, after giving us those Haydn symphonies, gave us two utterly inconsequential entr'actes from Mozart's "Thamos, King of Egypt." And the unfamiliar music of Handel promised by a public concert of the International Congress of the American Musicological Society a few years ago turned out to be mere exercises in which the youthful Handel tried his hand in styles of his period.

So with the music of earlier centuries, which Dr. Sachs probably was referring to. Musicologists are concerned about the belief of some people that nothing written before Bach is worth attention. "Music," wrote Dr. Lang in his article, "was a vital part of the culture of all ages and was affected by the same intellectual tendencies that animated the other arts and letters of the time"—the point being that the intellectual tendencies in early centuries which produced great literature and painting and architecture must have produced music as great as these other arts, and as great as the Mozart symphonies and Beethoven quartets of later centuries. But this contention is refuted by our own century, which has produced the painting of Picasso, among others, but no music of comparable magnitude: it is possible, then, for early centuries which produced great architecture or painting to have produced less great music, or music which satisfied their emotional requirements but not ours. And the contention is made not on behalf of the music of Victoria, Lassus, Palestrina, Byrd, the other English madrigalists, Monteverdi, Purcell—which many music-lovers do know and find beautiful; but on behalf of things like the inconsequential little pieces which Dr. Sachs offered us recently with the comment that "the music in this album is not 'ancient music'; stale, dusty, and at best a curio for historically minded snobs. It is no more 'ancient' than Rembrandt's painting or Gothic cathedrals."

Almost inevitably the crying up of what is remote involves a crying down of what is immediate—which, as inevitably, lessens the guiding influence and authority that Dr. Lang explicitly demands for the musicologists and that Dr. Sachs apparently resents their not getting. The newspapers *have* opened their columns to communications from Dr. Lang which have elaborated some of the points in his *American Scholar* article, and which like that article have been curiously unscholarly in their intemperateness and confusion of thought and expression and in their misrepresentation of fact to make it fit into their conceptual patterns. Like Dr. Graf's concept of *the* musical theater with which he flogs everything after the Greek, and Dr. Sachs's concept of *the* dance with which he flogs modern "phenomena of a social degeneration from the primitive typus," is Dr. Lang's concept of *the* "fundamental approach to an understanding of music" with which he flogs the musical life of today as he creates it to fit into his argument. This approach is "the road of intimate choral music, chamber music, piano music, and songs" performed, as they were written to be performed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in the home. With it he attacks the transfer of this music to "a huge auditorium," where the chamber music "began to transgress its limits and assume certain orchestral characteristics ill-befitting its nature," where the songs were "bellowed . . . by an operatic prima donna intent on bringing down the house," and where music which had been something people "literally lived with" became instead something they "face . . . as exhibition." And with it he attacks also the music for large orchestra written expressly for the large concert hall. But a man who argues that because music once was written to be performed by small groups of instruments or voices in a home composers today must not write for a large orchestra and we must not listen to quartets in Town Hall; who for this purpose misrepresents the Budapest Quartet's concerts of chamber music or Elisabeth Schumann's recitals of *Lieder;* who contends that we who listen to this music performed in a concert hall are affected by it less than an Esterhazy or a Lobkowitz who listened to it performed in his ballroom—such a man must be prepared to have us decline his guidance.

B. H. HAGGIN

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Letters to the Editors

Religion and Democracy

Dear Sirs: It is unfortunate that we constantly misquote the Gettysburg Address—in the sense that any passage taken out of its context and without essential qualifications is misquoted. We emphasize "government of the people, by the people, for the people" as if it were Lincoln's belief that such government is an absolute guaranty of freedom and that the "people" are immune to greed, nationalism, vindictiveness, lust for power, and the like. The passage is qualified by the hope "that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom," but this is overlooked by those who regard God as, at best, an unessential decoration, useful to beautify such things as are found to be worthy and deserving on other grounds. This was certainly not Lincoln's opinion. The two passages, read together, convey the message that government of the people is possible only under God.

While it has many implications, the principle is so easily explained that it took a highly sophisticated generation to ignore it. Since there must be established peace and order in society, man has the alternatives of submission to the power of other men and submission to objective standards which we revere as emanating from God. Either restraint by other men or restraint by the consciousness of a binding, although unverifiable, commandment—logic leaves no third possibility.

A reference to Jefferson will inevitably be opposed to the quotation from Lincoln. Jefferson believed in the saving force of human reason, as Lincoln did not do (see his Second Inaugural Address). But Jefferson, implicitly always and explicitly in several passages, believed in the reason in a man endowed with a Protestant conscience. Jefferson had little use for the living God of Christianity, but he depended on the man shaped by a belief in God, the sturdy, sober man educated by Puritanism.

It would be futile to deny that a genuine ethic can exist as an autonomous code, independent of the religion from which it was derived. But it can so exist only in individuals and for but a few generations. Such an ethic persists for a time because, though its representatives have forsworn religion, religion is still vigorous in them and keeps their eyes bright and their souls clean. It is as if the roots of a tree were drying up but the sap continued, for a while, to circulate in the trunk and twigs. It would be an error to infer that the tree could live if its roots had no sustenance, and religion is the sustenance of moral life.

The human soul is so constructed that it needs religion, needs a doctrine about the meaning and the center of life. When genuine religion is destroyed, man fills the vacuum with some inferior substitute, something that satisfies the psychological need for worship but misguides him because it is wrong. Genuine religion speaks in terms of dogma. That the world is one and demands to be organized by justice for peace is implied in the dogma of monotheism. It must be accepted or rejected, but it cannot be proved or refuted in terms of science.

In a scientific age, which insists on the tangible and verifiable, religion is discarded for science. But being the religious animal, man gradually succumbs to a pseudo-religion—a dogmatic, unverifiable belief which now informs his life and is mistaken for a scientific truth because it refers to something tangible. Intellectual progress, technics, nationalism, proletarian dictatorship, racialism—such are the new absolutes which absorb people's minds and are expected to conquer evil.

Nothing has contributed more to discrediting religion than the terrible religious wars of former centuries. As man fled from religion to escape the wars over religious dogma, he ran into wars stemming from pseudo-religions, from nationalism, and now finally from the racial horror.

Religion itself cannot be conceived with absolute clarity by man, because his mind is obstructed by prejudices and temptations. To these the representatives of organized religion are not immune. They should be the guardians of the standards of judgment, but they have been discredited by their political aspirations, culminating in the religious wars. Today, many Catholic churchmen have let themselves be swept off their feet by greedy appeasement interests, and many Protestant churchmen by a self-loving, cynical political pacifism. Both groups have been guilty of collusion with Hitlerism.

But these failings do not constitute an argument against religion any more than the abuse of science for war purposes or the nationalist fervor of professors provides an objection to scientific truth. They only prove that human minds are not clean and receptive vessels—which is precisely the assertion of Christianity. It follows that Christian democracy is not clericalism. Yet we need the churches, where the gospel is preached and the standards of judgment are preserved as a constant warning to erring men.

Religion does not make democracy safe; it only makes it possible. Religion does not make man good; he always remains liable to error and temptation, even though he knows the divine commandment. But the important thing which makes him man is that he does know the divine commandment, although he may violate it.

Christianity is not a religion for good men but for sinners. It gives them the hope that repentance will help them rise above the injustices they have committed and give them a new start, "a new birth." Christianity is the doctrine of renascence through repentance.

To say that democracy is right and totalitarianism is wrong is not convincing, for everyone realizes from his own experience that democracy today is morally weak and has failed badly. It has been unjust and indifferent enough to tolerate unemployment at home and chaos in the small states of Southeastern Europe which it established. It left it to Hitler to abolish unemployment by building his huge military machine and to give those small states a function within the German economic orbit. It thus made Hitler great. And it did not oppose him when there was time to do it. Appeasers, pacifists, and Communists, although fighting one another, cooperated in preventing resistance to the monster.

In short, democracy, originating in the founding of the Swiss Confederacy, the great discussions in the Cromwellian army, and the emigration of Roger Williams from Massachusetts, has been sadly sagging of late in spirit and virtue. It used to know that it could exist only on a foundation of democratic virtue. Today we do not teach virtue because we pretend to believe that it is a by-product of knowledge. A morally

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disintegrating democratic world disintegrates politically too and is visited by Hitlerism, its own product.

Now at last we come to realize, with a shock, the implications and consequences of our misdeeds, and this is our hope. If democracy is really shocked out of its moral laziness, it may become ripe for, and capable of, the repentance which will bring it, under God, a new birth of freedom.

EDUARD HEIMANN

New York, October 28

Neither Hitler nor Hapsburg

Dear Sirs: The clear statement in Miss Kirchwey's article on Hapsburg Hopes, in *The Nation* of October 24, that support for the idea of a Hapsburg restoration "would be taken as an unfriendly act and would seriously injure our relations with our allies in exile" is undoubtedly right. Let me add that support of the Hapsburgs would be felt as an unfriendly act not only by the Czechs, Poles, and Yugoslavs, but also by the great majority of the Austrian people. This fact is easily proved. The dethronement of the Hapsburgs and the confiscation of their property were voted unanimously by the Austrian Parliament. Since 1918 the Monarchists have not been able to obtain a single seat in the Austrian Parliament of 165 members, in any election.

It is true that during the dark times of semi-fascism, from 1934 to 1938, Otto Hapsburg was made an honorary citizen of many communities, but this was done by the mayors, who were not elected by the people but appointed by the dictator. Not one of the freely elected municipal councils of Austria voted to make Otto an honorary citizen.

There is not the slightest indication that these anti-monarchist convictions of the Austrians have changed. It is clear rather that monarchism is but the plaything of a handful of refugees, not the serious concern of the people.

It is not true that Hapsburg propaganda interferes with Hitler's policy. On the contrary, Hapsburg propaganda splits the anti-fascist front in Austria and paralyzes its most active section, the workers. The Austrian people have been strongly impressed by the fact that one of the relatives of Otto, the Archduke Albrecht, is at present fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Nazis against the Yugoslavs.

It is now very important to convince the Austrian people, especially the workers, that the Atlantic Charter is really the basis of the policy of the United Nations, that after the war every nation will have the right to decide its own destiny. If some "salons" in Washington and New York are playing at "Imperial Court" it is of course their private business; they probably do not realize that their play provides support for Goebbels's propaganda.

That is why I am taking the liberty of sending you these lines: to add my warning to yours, to point out clearly the danger in the Hapsburg aspirations. The only possible slogan for the whole of Central Europe is: "Neither Hitler nor Hapsburg."

JULIUS DEUTSCH

Former Secretary of War in Austria

New York, October 30

The Broadcasters and the Cooperatives

Dear Sirs: I write to express my appreciation for the editorial in your issue of October 17 criticizing N. B. C. and C. B. S. for their ban on the proposed broadcasts of the Cooperative League of the United States. In my opinion, no clearer case has ever existed of the power of big business to control and decide what the public can listen to. Freedom of speech and expression is meaningless unless those of us working day in and out to establish economic democracy have the opportunity to state the facts and let the people of this country voluntarily choose for themselves the type of business enterprise they want to support or own. I urge all *Nation* readers to write N. B. C. and C. B. S. protesting against the ban.

BENJAMIN B. NAUMOFF,

President, Eastern Cooperative League

Schenectady, N. Y., October 26

Dear Sirs: The reason given by the Columbia Broadcasting System for its refusal of time to the Cooperative League, namely, that the code of the National Association of Broadcasters prohibits the sale of time for programs devoted to "public controversial issues," is quibbling.

What about the Town Hall programs, those fine weekly events which show that the radio can give us something better than jazz, wisecracks, and soap dramas? Many of its discussions are about nothing but controversial issues. One has only to recall the argument on the poll tax on October 22 or the famous Ickes-Gannett fracas!

CHARLES HERBERT HUESTIS

Edmonton, Canada, October 23

Training for Pacifists

Dear Sirs: A recent issue of *The Nation* referred to the fact that a number of conscientious objectors were taking courses to prepare to serve as administrative officials in relief and reconstruction agencies in occupied countries. You went on to say "the pacifists will be trained as civilian aides to the military men."

It is not correct that the pacifists are being trained as civilian aides to the military men. The pacifists, who were selected from Civilian Public Service Camps throughout the country, have no obligation whatever to the army or navy or any other government agency. They will work for such organizations as the American Friends Service Committee as opportunity opens after the war.

A. J. MUSTE, Executive Secretary,
Fellowship of Reconciliation

New York, October 21

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